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Abstract 
 
 There are many reasons why managers are interested in maintaining control over 
their firm.  Some potential reasons include compensation, autonomy, power, perquisites, 
and the ability to determine the terms under which the firm is acquired.  This study 
examines one event that provides an opportunity for managers to take actions designed to 
maintain control of firm, the initial public offering (IPO).  A simple rationing approach 
provides the m echanism  w hich im pacts m anagem ent’s ability to m aintain control.  The 
hypothesis underlying this study is that managers strategically underprice the IPO to 
influence outside blockholdings.  By preventing large outside blocks from forming as 
part of the IPO, management reduces the incentive for outsiders to monitor their actions, 
resulting in greater autonomy. 
Chapter One documents that IPO underpricing is significantly related to country-
level governance characteristics.  Examining a sample of 4.698 IPOs across 24 countries 
for the 2000-2004 time period, the results suggest that IPO underpricing is higher in 
countries which offer greater protection to investors.  These findings are consistent with 
the hypothesis that IPO underpricing is an instrument used by managers to maintain 
control of the firm when country-level governance m echanism s favor investors’ rights 
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Chapter Two finds that IPO underpricing exhibits a significant, positive relation 
with activity in the market for corporate control.  Examining a sample of over 2,300 
initial public offerings in the United States over the 1990-1998 time period, the results 
suggest that underpricing is greater when the market for corporate control is active.  
Additional results indicate that the corporate control climate prevailing at the time of the 
offering is related to the likelihood that a firm survives in subsequent years, that 
underpricing is associated with the post-offering ownership structure, and that the size of 
the external blockholdings formed concurrent with the offering are positively related to 
the probability a firm is taken over in the years following the event.  Together, the 
findings presented in this study are consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is an 
instrument used to protect managers when other governance mechanisms, including 
investors’ rights and the market for corporate control, threaten their control over the firm. 
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Chapter One – International IPO Underpricing and Investor Protection 
1.  Introduction 
 Few areas of finance have captivated the attention of researchers, practitioners, 
the media, and the public as much as initial public offerings (IPOs), in particular the 
frequently large, first day gains to new issues.  Many studies over the past few decades 
document IPO underpricing in individual countries, concluding as a whole that IPOs are 
on average underpriced in all time periods and in all countries with organized stock 
exchanges.  More recent studies examining the link between IPO underpricing and 
issuing firm governance characteristics look at the determinants of this phenomenon.  
The existing research examining IPO underpricing as a function of governance 
characteristics generally takes a narrow approach by examining underpricing and its 
determinants in a single country, most often focusing on new issues in the United States.  
Studies incorporating a cross-sectional examination of IPO underpricing across a 
significant sample of countries appear to be non-existent.  At a minimum, this study aims 
to correct this oversight in the academic literature. 
 The globalization of financial markets is another burgeoning area of interest to 
finance researchers and practitioners alike.  The liberalization which has taken root in 
m any of the w orlds’ econom ies has invigorated an era in which many firms are global 
firms with the ability to raise capital in dozens of markets around the world.  This trend 
towards market integration has spawned a large body of research, often referred to as the 
law and finance literature, examining country-level governance characteristics and their 
effects on capital markets.  A common theme in this strand of literature is the relation 
between investor protection and the breadth and depth of a country’s capital m arkets 
(LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997).   
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A neglected consideration is the relation between IPO underpricing and country-
level governance.  In particular, there is no research relating the initial returns on public 
offerings to management’s desire to maintain control of the firm and the country-level 
protections provided to investors.  This study addresses this issue by testing whether a 
relation exists between the initial returns on IPOs and the degree of investor protection 
across a large sample of countries and IPO events. 
 Examining 4,698 IPO events representing 24 countries for the period 2000-2004, 
I first document that IPOs are underpriced, on average, in every country in the sample, 
with a mean initial return of 30.51 percent.  The analysis continues by examining the 
relation between underpricing and country-level governance characteristics, including the 
protection of shareholders, creditor rights, corporate control activity, CEO turnover, and 
property rights.  The results suggest that IPOs are underpriced more on average when 
investors are offered greater degrees of protection through such mechanisms.   
The empirical results of this paper are consistent with a number of earlier studies 
that consider the relation between initial public offerings and the ownership structure of 
the firm, including Zingales (1995), Brennan and Franks (1997) and Mello and Parsons 
(1998).  For example, Brennan and Franks posit that IPO underpricing is used 
strategically by issuers to influence the dispersion of share ownership in the aftermarket.  
This greater dispersion of share ownership results in the presence of fewer influential 
blockholders, resulting in a stronger controlling position for management.  If investors 
are offered greater protections through the rules and norms of society, managers must 
pursue other avenues to strengthen their control of the firm.  My hypothesis is that 
underpricing is one such substitute mechanism used by management to maintain control, 
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resulting in greater underpricing in countries which offer better protections to investors.  
Alternatively, substitute mechanisms to strengthen managerial control, including IPO 
underpricing, are less important in countries which offer weaker protections to investors. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 highlights 
previous research on the benefits of control, IPO underpricing, and country-level 
governance related to this study.  Section 3 describes my sample construction process and 
the methodology utilized in my sample analysis.  Section 4 presents evidence of a strong 
relation between IPO underpricing and country-level governance characteristics, while 
Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2.  Previous research 
A.  Managerial control 
 The benefits that a controlling position imparts on the manager-entrepreneur have 
a number of implications.  A large body of literature, centered on the pioneering work of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), examines the mechanisms designed to align the interests of 
management and shareholders.  Such mechanisms include firm-specific characteristics 
such as the board of directors, the design of managerial compensation plans, and the 
structure and size of managerial and block ownership positions as well as external 
influences such as the managerial labor market and the market for corporate control.  
Each of these governance mechanisms plays a role in providing incentives for 
management to make decisions not only with their own interests in mind, but also the 
interests of other stakeholders in the firm, particularly shareholders.  For example, large 
external blockholders are expected to provide greater levels of managerial oversight 
because the significant size of their ownership position gives them added incentive to see 
that their best interests are pursued by management. 
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 A primary area of study related to control explores the actions which managers 
take in an effort to maintain and strengthen their hold on the firm.  Such actions include, 
but are not limited to, holding controlling ownership stakes (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), 
the implementation of dual class structures (Nenova, 2003), the configuration of the 
board of directors (B aker and G om pers, 2004), and diversification of the firm ’s 
operations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).  A recurrent theme in the literature on control for 
the purposes of this study is that control has inherent value.  Because control has value, 
managers have incentive to take actions which allow them to maintain, or even 
strengthen, their control over the firm.  The devices available depend on the environment 
in which the firm operates and m anagem ent’s behavior is influenced by the mechanisms 
at their disposal which facilitate their goal to control the firm. 
A number of theoretical works consider issues of control while focusing on the 
firm ’s initial public offering and subsequent ownership structure.  Zingales (1995) 
hypothesizes that the IPO represents the first step in the transfer of control of the firm 
from  the entrepreneur to a new  ow ner.  In Z ingales’ m odel, the entrepreneur uses the IP O  
to assemble the ownership structure that allows him to maximize his proceeds in an 
eventual control transaction.  Z ingales’ m odel suggests that the value of cash flow  rights 
are maximized by selling to dispersed shareholders, for which the IPO is ideally suited.  
On the other hand, the value of the entrepreneur’s control position is m axim ized by 
bargaining directly with potential suitors, which is expected to occur subsequent to the 
IPO. 
Like Zingales, Mello and Parsons (1998) hypothesize that it is optimal to sell 
shares to small, dispersed investors at the time of the IPO with the transfer of control 
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occurring at a later date.  By selling to small investors through the IPO, the seller gathers 
information that helps him maximize his proceeds in a subsequent control transaction.  
For example, the sale of shares to small investors in the IPO and subsequent trading in 
the secondary market establish a market price for the firm which may aid the 
entrepreneur in gauging demand and negotiating the sale of the control block.  
Alternatively, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) posit that the optimal strategy is to establish 
large blockholders as part of the IPO.  In their model, the formation of sizeable 
blockholders increases the value of the firm through increased monitoring of 
management, allowing for the sale of subsequent shares at a higher price. 
Bebchuk (1999) introduces the size of the private benefits of control into the 
discussion of ownership structure and the IPO.  Bebchuk hypothesizes that as the benefits 
of control become larger, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to maintain control of the firm 
to discourage outsiders from making the firm a target.  Additionally, like Zingales and 
Mello and Parsons, Bebchuk posits that maintaining control at the time of the IPO allows 
the initial owner to maximize his proceeds in a subsequent control transfer.  Finally, 
Bebchuk suggests two primary motivations for the use of antitakeover devices, to prevent 
unw anted acquisition attem pts and to increase the entrepreneur’s proceed s in a successful 
transfer of control. 
B.  IPO underpricing 
 A significant amount of empirical research, dating back at least to Ibbotson’s 
(1975) study documents short-run underpricing of initial public offerings in the United 
States.  Similar studies present consistent evidence of short-run underpricing of initial 
public offerings in many international markets (Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994).  In 
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sum, the underpricing of IPOs across time and in all countries examined is well 
documented.  Additionally, it has been casually observed that there is significant 
variation in the degree of underpricing across countries. 
 Theories of IPO underpricing began to appear shortly after the introduction of the 
literature documenting the large initial returns to new issues.  Characteristics of the 
issuing firm, the issue and the general market climate have all been cited as possible 
determinants of IPO underpricing.  Benveniste and Spindt (1989) hypothesize that 
underpricing is used to acquire information from potential purchasers of the issue.  As 
such, IPO underpricing is a cost of acquiring information during the bookbuilding 
process.  Carter and Manaster (1990) conjecture that firms use prestigious underwriters to 
signal low risk in an effort to combat the effects of information asymmetry.  Consistent 
with their hypothesis, they find that firms using more reputable underwriters exhibit 
lower initial returns on average.  Additional theories of IPO underpricing include the 
“w inner’s curse” hypothesis of R ock (1986), information cascades (Welch, 1992), legal 
liability avoidance (Tinic, 1988), an absence of motivation to avoid underpricing (Habib 
and L jungqvist, 2001) and “analyst lust” (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). 
Brennan and Franks (1997) hypothesize that one motivation for underpricing is 
m anagem ent’s desire to control the firm.  Utilizing a sample of U.K. IPOs, the authors 
present empirical evidence consistent with their hypothesis that underpricing is used to 
strategically influence a dispersed outside ownership structure, reducing the likelihood 
that ownership blocks are formed at the time of the issue.  By reducing the probability 
that ownership blocks are formed at the time of the offering, the likelihood of 
management maintaining effective control of the firm is increased, allowing them to 
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continue to enjoy the private benefits that accompany the position of control.  While it is 
possible that ownership blocks are formed following the issue, the initial dispersed 
ownership structure makes it more costly to form these blocks. 
In a unique test of the B rennan and F ranks “reduced m onitoring hypothesis,” 
Smart and Zutter (2003) compare single- and dual-class issuers in the United States and 
find lower levels of underpricing for dual-class offerings.  Their empirical results are 
consistent with the reduced monitoring hypothesis as managers of dual-class firms have a 
substitute mechanism at their disposal for maintaining control of the firm, namely the 
class of stock imparting superior voting rights.  The presence of this substitute 
mechanism reduces the need to underprice shares since a dispersed outside ownership 
structure is less important when superior voting rights stock provides the control that 
management desires.  In effect, the dual-class structure guarantees managerial control, 
reducing the need for substitute mechanisms such as IPO underpricing.   
Field and Karpoff (2002) provide additional evidence consistent with the reduced 
monitoring hypothesis.  In particular, the authors document that takeover defenses are 
employed by a significant number of firms at the time of the initial public offering and 
that these mechanisms are effective in allowing management to maintain control of the 
firm.  Contrary to studies supporting the reduced monitoring hypothesis, Arugaslan, Cook 
and Kieschnick (2004) conclude that monitoring is not a primary motivation for offer 
underpricing.  They argue that earlier tests fail to consider important determinants of 
underpricing and institutional ownership, most importantly firm size, which led to results 
supportive of the reduced monitoring hypothesis. 
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C.  Country corporate governance 
Like initial public offerings, international corporate governance is a burgeoning 
area of research in finance.  LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2006) authored a series of articles over the past decade 
examining the association between country-level governance characteristics, including 
investor protections, accounting standards, creditor rights, and property rights, and the 
development of capital markets.  LaPorta et al. provide evidence that country 
characteristics such as legal origin have a strong influence on a country’s governance, 
which in turn has a profound impact on the development of the country’s capital markets.  
International governance studies like those of LaPorta et al. provide the basis for country-
level governance metrics utilized in this study. 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) examine the association between country-level 
governance and financial market development.  Their research finds that the mere 
presence of insider trading laws is not reflected in the cost of equity in a country.  
Instead, the initial enforcement of insider trading laws is the event that triggers a decrease 
in the cost of equity.  In an extension of their earlier study, Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2005) hypothesize that it can be the case that the absence of law is better than an 
unenforced law.  Finally, Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) find that trading in a 
country’s stock  markets declines when earnings opacity increases.  Together, the work of 
LaPorta et al. and Bhattacharya et al. illustrate the importance of investor protection to 
the development and continued effectiveness of a country’s capital m arkets. 
The hypothesis presented here assumes that control is valuable to a certain degree 
in all countries.  Because control is valuable, managers are motivated to take actions to 
ensure they maintain control.  Countries offering weaker protections to investors allow 
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management to maintain their position of control to a greater degree simply based on the 
laws of the nation.  For example, countries with infrequent corporate control events 
insulate management from losing control in a takeover transaction.  Alternatively, control 
is more tenuous in countries with strong investor protections.  As such, managers are 
forced to seek alternative ways to maintain control in such countries.  The hypothesis 
presented here is that IPO underpricing is one such alternative mechanism, resulting in 
greater underpricing in countries with better investor protection, where substitute vehicles 
for maintaining control are more likely to be employed. 
3.  Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
A.  Sample selection 
 The starting point for construction of the sample of countries consists of the 49 
nations which provide the foundation for the international governance studies of LaPorta 
et al.  The list of countries is narrowed further by including only those examined by 
LaPorta et al. which are also included in Dyck and Zingales (2004) study of the private 
benefits of control.  The intersection of the 49 countries contained in the LaPorta et al. 
studies with the 39 countries addressed by Dyck and Zingales results an initial sample of 
37 countries. 
IPO events are identified using T hom son F inancial’s SD C  P latinum  database.  All 
IPOs for the period 2000-2004 are pulled from the various country and regional New 
Issues databases.  IPO events are restricted to new listings in one of the 37 countries 
identified as detailed above.  Price and volume information for the new issues is retrieved 
from Datastream, which requires manually matching the IPO issuer to its unique 
Datastream identifier, resulting in a final sample of 4,698 IPO events. 
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 Restrictions on minimum offer prices are common in the IPO literature.  For 
example, Ritter (1991) restricts his sample to U.S. IPOs with a minimum offer price of 
$1.00.  The impact of the bid-ask bounce is the primary justification for a minimum offer 
price.  Imposing such a filter has an enormous impact on the current sample, eliminating 
a number of countries entirely from the analysis, while greatly reducing the number of 
IPOs in many of the countries which remain.  Applying even a $1 minimum offer price 
eliminates almost one-third of the sample events.  As such, the analysis as reported does 
not impose a minimum offer price requirement.1  Precedent for the absence of a 
minimum offer price is found in Ljungqvist (2005), who does not mention such a 
restriction when documenting IPO underpricing in various international markets.  
B.  Descriptive statistics 
 Figures 1 through 5 and Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for the 
sample of initial public offerings.  Figure 1 illustrates mean underpricing by country of 
listing, while the expanded data underlying this figure is present in Table 1.  Coffee 
(1999, 2002) suggests that firms cross-list in order to bond themselves to the standards of 
the listing market.  In particular, firms cross-listing in the U.S. are subject to the powers 
of the SEC, required to meet generally accepted accounting principles, and face the 
scrutiny of the financial intermediaries involved in the security markets.  While most 
sample IPOs originate and list in the same country, a number of companies choose to list 
outside their country of origin.  The vast majority of these cross-listing firms list in the 
United States.  Since cross-listing is thought to serve as a way to bond management to the 
standards of the listing country, the country in which the firm lists is the important 
                                                 
1 Robustness tests were performed using the following minimum offer price restrictions:  $1, $3, $5 and 
$10.  The main conclusions of the analysis are the same when these minimums were applied. 
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location for this study.2  Figure 1 demonstrates the prevalence of IPO underpricing, 
which occurs in all of the sample countries.  The average sample IPO is underpriced by 
30.51%.  IPOs are on average underpriced the most in South Korea (70.23%) and the 
least in Taiwan (1.9%). 
Figures 2 and 3 displays the total number of IPOs (Figure 2) and the average IPO 
underpricing by issue year (Figure 3).  Figure 2 clearly illustrates the slow down in equity 
offerings following the downturn in m any of the w orld’s equity m arkets in 2000.  T he 
current sample contains 1,439 IPOs in 2000, which declines by over 50 percent to 709 in 
2003, then increases to 1,206 issues in 2004.  C onsistent w ith the “hot issues m arket” 
phenomenon identified in the literature (Ritter, 1984), average underpricing is highly 
correlated with the number of IPOs in a given year with a correlation coefficient of 0.689.  
To account for the hot issues phenomenon, I control for issue year and recent market 
returns in my regression analysis. 
 Figure 4 reflects the composition of the IPO sample based on the industry of the 
issuing firm.  The broad industry classifications of Securities Data Corporation (SDC) as 
identified in Dyck and Zingales (2004) form the basis for the industry distribution.  
Additionally, hi-tech firms are separated from their SDC industry using the hi-tech SIC 
codes identified in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003).  The industry decomposition in 
Figure 4 shows that the sample is dominated by the usual suspects.  To account for the 
industry composition of my sample, industry dummy variables are employed in the 
regression analysis.  The partitioning of hi-tech firms into a unique category is motivated 
by the IPO literature finding greater levels of underpricing for hi-tech firms in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, including the study of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003).  
                                                 
2 Robustness tests indicate that the results are quantitatively unchanged by focusing on country of origin. 
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Consistent with the results of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm and others, Figure 5 demonstrates 
greater average underpricing for firms in hi-tech industries compared to other industries 
in the sample.  In fact, hi-tech firms experience an initial price increase of nearly 40 
percent on average, while the average for all IPOs outside of the hi-tech industry 
classification is approximately 27 percent.  Outside of the hi-tech industry, average IPO 
underpricing ranges from 16.65 percent for mining firms to 31.68 percent for firms in a 
service industry. 
4.  Empirical results 
A.  Proxies for control 
 The law and finance literature examines the association between country 
characteristics such as the protections afforded to investors, accounting standards, and 
enforcem ent of property rights, and the developm ent of a country’s capital m arkets.  A 
number of earlier studies, including LaPorta et al., Bhattacharya et al., Jaggers and 
Marshall (2000), and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003), present summary 
measures of country-level governance characteristics from which the current study 
benefits.  Table 2 contains a list and descriptions of the measures utilized in the empirical 
analysis.  The governance measures examine characteristics such as accounting 
standards, protection of investors (shareholders and creditors), CEO turnover frequency, 
level of democracy, disclosure standards, efficiency and enforcement abilities of the legal 
system, property rights enforcement, corporate control climate, and the overall rule of 
law on a nation by nation basis.  Table 3 contains the values for the country-level 
governance characteristics utilized in the subsequent analysis, while Table 4 illustrates 
the correlation of the various proxies.  To alleviate concerns centered on multicollinearity 
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of my independent variables, I demonstrate a number of variations of my base model in 
the multiple regression section (Table 7). 
 Table 5 presents univariate comparisons of underpricing for events above and 
below the mean value for each governance characteristic utilized in this study.  P-values 
resulting from tests of equality of means are also presented in the final column.  The 
results in Table 5 indicate that underpricing is significantly greater for IPOs taking place 
in the presence of higher levels of antidirector rights, CEO turnover, creditor rights, 
democracy, corporate control activity, property rights, and rule of law.  Underpricing is 
lower when measures of accounting standards, disclosure standards and public law 
enforcement are higher.  Finally, the difference in underpricing for events above and 
below the mean value of efficiency of the judiciary is not significant.  Overall, these 
results offer preliminary evidence of an association between underpricing and country-
level governance characteristics. 
B.  Single measure regression analysis 
 While Table 5 presents unconditional evidence of an association between 
underpricing and country-level governance, a more detailed examination is necessary.  
Table 6 controls for factors related to underpricing identified by earlier studies while 
introducing single measures of country-level governance.  Each regression in the 
remaining analysis includes five control variables as well as year and industry dummy 
variables.  The year dummies are generally not significant, with the exception of the 2004 
dummy which is often positive and significant, while the hi-tech industry dummy is the 
only industry dummy variable that exhibits any statistical significance, generally 
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indicating a positive and significant coefficient.  These results are consistent with Figures 
3 and 5 detailed in the descriptive statistics discussion above. 
 The control variables utilized in Table 6 include a stock market turnover ratio as 
reported in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000), an indicator variable set to one if 
the offer price is an integer value, the (log) size of the offer in U.S. dollars, a variable 
measuring the recent new issue activity in the listing country, and the market returns in 
the country of listing over the three months prior to the month of issuance.  These control 
variables are included to account for a number of empirical regularities identified in the 
IPO underpricing literature.  The turnover ratio, defined by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine as dollar volume divided by (deflated) market capitalization, represents a proxy 
for the liquidity of the stock market in the country of listing by event year.  If IPOs are 
underpriced to improve post-issue liquidity, underpricing should be higher in countries 
exhibiting less liquidity.  Bradley, Cooney, Jordan, and Singh (2004) hypothesize that 
offerings issued at integer values are more uncertain than IPOs priced at more refined 
values.  The IPO literature predicts that more uncertain offerings will exhibit larger first 
day returns, therefore offerings priced on an integer are expected to be more severely 
underpriced.   
Offer size can proxy for a number of factors including the information asymmetry 
surrounding the offering.  Larger offerings are likely to present less information 
asymmetry as investors are expected to require and receive more information on these 
offerings during the bookbuilding process.  Additionally, larger offerings are more likely 
to come from more established, older, and more profitable firms.  As such, a negative 
relation between initial returns and offer size is anticipated.  IPO activity is measured as 
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the ratio of the total number of IPOs in the issue year and the total number of firms listed 
in the country in 2000.  This variable is intended to control for hot issue markets and is 
expected to exhibit a positive relation with initial returns.  The final control variable in 
Table 6 examines the market returns in the listing country in the three months prior to the 
new issue.  This variable may also capture the hot issue market phenomenon while 
representing a more general gauge of the market conditions prevailing in the listing 
country at the time of the issue.  The control for recent market returns is expected to 
exhibit a positive coefficient, as IPOs issued during times of recent overall market 
success are greeted more favorably by investors, leading to greater initial gains.   
The first regression model presented in Table 6 highlights the relation between 
initial returns and the control variables.  This base model highlights a significant, positive 
relation between underpricing and the liquidity control, integer offer price dummy and 
recent market returns and a consistent, negative association between underpricing and 
offer size.  The relation between underpricing and the proxy for recent IPO activity is not 
significant in the base regression, but exhibits the expected positive and significant 
association in many subsequent regressions.  The relations between initial returns and the 
control variables generally continue to hold as the governance proxies are added to the 
regression equation on an individual basis in subsequent models. 
 Table 6 model 2 explores the relation between initial returns and accounting 
standards where higher accounting standards represent countries with more informative 
financial statements, based on a survey of the inclusion or omission of 90 items (LaPorta 
et al., 1998).  The coefficient on the accounting standards proxy is not significant.  Model 
3 illustrates that underpricing is significantly higher in countries offering greater 
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shareholder protection, as measured by the antidirector rights index.    The available CEO 
turnover data is for the period 1993-1998, requiring the construction of a general proxy to 
measure the managerial labor market.3  Aggregate CEO turnover is constructed by 
country for the 1993-1998 period.  The aggregate level of turnover is then divided by the 
number of publicly listed firms as of the year 1996 for the country of origin to construct 
the CEO turnover proxy.  The coefficient measuring the relation between CEO turnover 
and underpricing is positive and statistically significant as illustrated in Model 4.  Like 
the shareholder rights index, the index of creditor rights exhibits a positive relation with 
underpricing.  In the final model of Panel A, the relation between initial returns and the 
level of dem ocracy, w here higher dem ocracy scores represent “higher degrees of 
institutionalized dem ocracy” (L aP orta et al., 2006), is positive and statistically 
significant. 
 Panel B of Table 6 examines the remaining country-level governance proxies.  
The relation betw een initial returns and a country’s disclosure stand ards is not 
statistically significant.  The efficiency of the judiciary is positively associated with 
underpricing as detailed in model 8.  As is the case with the CEO turnover proxy, the 
merger and acquisition activity proxy is measured at the country of origin level, as the 
country of origin is a better reflection of the corporate control climate surrounding the 
firm producing the new offering.  Corporate control activity is calculated for each country 
and sample year as the number of completed mergers and acquisitions listed in Thomson 
F inancial’s SD C  P latinum  M ergers and A cquisitions Database divided by the number of 
publicly listed firms as of the year 2000 for the country of origin.  Consistent with 
Boulton (2006), Table 6 model 9 illustrates that in countries with a more active market 
                                                 
3 The author thanks Hazem Daouk for providing the CEO turnover data used in this study. 
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for control, IPO underpricing is greater on average.  This result is further evidence that 
IPO underpricing may be used by management to maintain control when other 
mechanisms reduce their ability to control the firm.   
Additional models examining the relation between underpricing and property 
rights, public law enforcement, and the rule of law close out Table 6.  The relation 
between underpricing and property rights is positive and significant, as is the association 
between underpricing and the rule of law.  The only proxy examined in Table 6 that 
presents a result counter to the hypothesis of this study is the public enforcement index, 
which contains a negative and significant coefficient in model 11.  A later section 
decomposes the public enforcement index into its individual components to shed some 
additional light on this interesting result.  Otherwise, the results in Table 6 support the 
notion that IPO underpricing is greater in sample countries with stronger governance, 
exactly the countries where management is hypothesized to utilize substitute mechanisms 
to maintain control of the firm. 
C.  Multi-measure regression analysis 
 Table 7 examines the relation between IPO underpricing and governance by 
considering multiple governance proxies in each regression model.  The proxies carried 
forward to table 7 represent the governance proxies that are statistically significant in the 
table 6 models when considered individually.  Regressions of the control variables, year 
and industry dummies along with various combinations of the antidirector rights index, 
creditor rights index, CEO turnover, level of democracy, efficiency of the judiciary, 
control activity, property rights, public enforcement index, and rule of law provide 
convincing evidence in support of the hypothesis at the center of this study.  Each of the 
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models of table 7 include the antidirector rights index and creditor rights index as these 
represent the most direct measures of investor protection utilized in this study.  
Additionally, based on the strength of the relation between underpricing and the public 
enforcement index, this proxy is also included in each regression in Table 7. 
 The control variables generally continue to exhibit the relations established in the 
single governance metric regressions of Table 6 as IPOs issued in more liquid markets 
and offerings following large recent market returns are associated with higher initial 
returns while offer size and underpricing are negatively related.  While the proxies for 
issue uncertainty and recent IPO activity are not always significant, they do exhibit the 
expected, positive relation with underpricing in the models in which they are statistically 
significant.  The individual proxies for country-level governance continue to support the 
hypothesis predicting a positive relation between governance and underpricing.  
Shareholder and creditor rights consistently exhibit a positive relation with underpricing, 
indicating that greater investor protections are associated with larger first day returns.  
The public enforcement index continues to exhibit a negative relation with underpricing, 
suggesting that in countries with stronger enforcement of securities laws, initial returns 
are smaller, on average.  Of the remaining governance variables, only the proxy for 
corporate control activity demonstrates a positive and significant relation with 
underpricing in each model in which it enters, implying that underpricing is generally 
greater in countries with more active takeover markets. 
The proxy for a country’s level of dem ocracy is not significant in either of the two 
models in which it appears.  Efficiency of judiciary is significant when combined with 
the antidirector rights index, creditor right index and public enforcement index, but loses 
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its statistical significance in the all-inclusive final model.  Finally, the property rights 
index exhibits a positive relation with underpricing, while the rule of law is negatively 
associated with underpricing in the final model.  Overall, the proxies for corporate 
control examined in Tables 6 and 7 provide strong support for the hypothesis that 
underpricing is a mechanism used by management when substitute instruments for 
maintaining control are less accessible.  In particular, when the rights of investors are 
protected by law and societal norms and when the market for corporate control is active, 
managers use underpricing to maintain control of the firm in a manner consistent with 
B rennan and F ranks’ reduced monitoring hypothesis. 
D.  Governance proxy component regressions 
 A number of governance proxies utilized in prior tables represent indexes of 
multiple governance characteristics.  For example, the antidirector rights index is 
comprised of six components shareholder rights including:  (1) the ability to mail proxy 
votes, (2) no blocking of shares prior to meetings, (3) cumulative voting provisions, (4) 
oppressed minority mechanisms, (5) minimum share requirements for calling 
extraordinary shareholders meetings, and (6) preemptive rights (LaPorta et al. 1998).  
Further information on the components of the indexes utilized in this study is given in 
Table 3.   
 Table 8 examines the components of three of the prominent indexes used in this 
study, the antidirector rights index (Panel A), the creditor rights index (Panel B), and the 
public enforcement index (Panel C).  The relation between underpricing and these 
indexes was discussed in detail in the previous section.  The goal of this section is to drill 
down into the individual indexes to determine which factors drive the positive relation 
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between underpricing and antidirector and creditor rights and the negative relation 
between initial returns and the public enforcement index. 
 Table 8, Panel A examines the components of the antidirector rights index.  The 
regression includes the standard control variables utilized in earlier models as well as 
year and industry dummy variables.  Based on the results of this regression, a single 
component of the antidirector rights index drive the positive relation between IPO 
underpricing and shareholder rights, the absence of rules blocking shares before 
shareholder meetings.  The ability to mail proxies, cumulative voting provisions, and 
preemptive rights are negatively related to underpricing.  Finally, the coefficients on the 
oppressed minority mechanism proxy and the variable controlling for the minimum 
percentage of share capital required to call a shareholder meeting are not significant.
 Three of the four components of the creditor rights index appear to drive to the 
positive relation between creditor rights and IPO underpricing (Table 8, Panel B).  
Coefficients on the proxies for restrictions on chapter 11 filing, adherence to priority of 
claims upon asset disposition, and removal of management upon bankruptcy filing are 
positive and statistically significant. The ability of creditors to gain possession of assets 
when a reorganization petition if filed is negatively related to underpricing.  These results 
illustrate the specific rights that drive the positive relation between underpricing and 
creditor rights identified in earlier regressions. 
 Panel C of Table 8 presents the analysis of the components of the public 
enforcement index.  Recall the strong negative relation between underpricing and the 
public enforcement index identified in Table 6.  The Table 8 results indicate that this 
negative relation is driven by three factors:  the characteristics of the supervisor with 
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oversight of the country’s m ain stock exchange, power of the supervisor to make rules, 
and the availability of criminal sanctions for individuals issuing misleading financial 
statements.  On the other hand, there exist positive relations between underpricing and 
the investigative and order issuing powers of the supervisor in charge of the country’s 
main stock exchange, although these relations are overwhelmed by the negative relation 
between underpricing and the other components when the measures are combined to form 
a single, public enforcement index.  Overall, the decomposition of the antidirector rights 
index, creditor rights index, and public enforcement index serve to more specifically 
identify the cause of the relation between underpricing and these governance proxies. 
E.  Robustness checks 
 Several robustness checks confirm the positive relation between underpricing and 
country-level governance.  The first robustness check examines the impact of the large 
number of U.S. offerings on the results.  New issues in the United States dominate the 
sample, representing over 20 percent of the IPO events.  To determine if the results are 
driven by listings in the U.S., the empirical results were replicated excluding U.S.-listed 
IPOs.  Excluding these IPOs also removes the majority of cross-listed firms, as most of 
these firms list on a U.S. exchange.  Overall, the empirical results change little under this 
modification, confirming that the results are not driven by firms listed in the U.S. 
 Two sample countries, France and Taiwan, impose daily volatility limits on 
security returns during the sample period, potentially muting the effects of IPO 
underpricing in those nations.  Following the methodology established by Ljungqvist 
(2005), underpricing in France and Taiwan is measured using the first observation five 
days after the initial public offering in the above analysis.  To examine the impact of this 
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adjustment, the entire analysis is performed excluding all offerings listed in France and 
Taiwan.  Exclusion of these two countries reduces the sample size by eliminating 222 
French and 333 Taiwanese IPOs meeting the sample criteria.  The results remain 
essentially unchanged, with consistently strong evidence that managers underprice more 
in countries where substitute control mechanisms are unavailable.  In particular, 
underpricing is larger in countries offering greater shareholder protections, in nations 
with better enforcement of property rights, and in countries with more corporate control 
activity. 
5.  Conclusions 
 The results suggest that IPO underpricing is greater in countries offering stronger 
protections to investors after controlling for additional factors identified in the literature 
related to initial returns.  The results hold for various country-level proxies of investor 
protection, and are both economically and statistically significant.  Viewed in the context 
of Brennan and Franks’ (1997) reduced monitoring hypothesis, these results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that managers use underpricing as a mechanism to 
preserve control of the firm when other avenues for maintaining control are unavailable.  
In countries that offer lower levels of investor protection, underpricing is less likely to be 
used as an instrument to maintain control because managerial control is implicit due to 
the general disregard for investor’s rights.  It must be noted that I have provided no 
evidence for or against the effectiveness of underpricing as a means for maintaining 
control.  An interesting area of follow up would be to determine the success of 
underpricing as a method for maintaining control, as was done by Smart and Zutter 
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(2003) in their examination of dual-class IPOs and Boulton (2006) for a sample single-
class U.S. IPOs. 
 The results presented here are also consistent with various studies examining 
issues of ownership structure related to the IPO.  Zingales (1995) and Mello and Parsons 
(1998) hypothesize that one goal of the IPO is the creation of a dispersed outside 
ownership structure.  A dispersed outside ownership structure facilitates managerial 
control over the firm, while also allowing management to determine the terms under 
which a transfer of control should take place.  In the presence of strong investor 
protections, a dispersed outside ownership structure becomes more important for 
maintaining managerial control.  In the context of this paper, underpricing is a substitute 
mechanism which allows management to maintain or even strengthen control over the 
firm. 
 While maintaining control is one of many potential motivations for underpricing 
initial public offerings, the evidence provided here is convincing and consistent in its 
support of the reduced monitoring hypothesis.  However, there are undoubtedly 
additional factors that are related to underpricing which are not explored here.  
Additionally, because of the enormous data requirements to explore all of the variations 
in the IPO events, the proxies and controls utilized in this study are necessarily general.  
As data availability improves for international markets, further refinements of this topic 
may evolve and shed additional light on the relation between underpricing and 
governance. 
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Chapter Two – IPO Underpricing and Corporate Control 
1.  Introduction 
 The spectacular first day gains realized by many initial public offerings (IPOs) is 
a subject that has fascinated investors, practitioners, and researchers for decades.  
Academic studies focus a great deal of attention on trying to explain why companies are 
willing to offer their shares to the public at an apparent discount.  Dozens of possible 
explanations exist, including information acquisition (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), the 
“w inner’s curse” (R ock, 1986), legal liabilities (T inic, 1986), control considerations 
(Brennan and Franks, 1997), and a desire for top-ranked analyst coverage (Loughran and 
Ritter, 2002). 
 The corporate control literature documents waves in merger and acquisition 
activity over time and offers various explanations for this clustering of activity.  Events 
such as deregulation have the ability to significantly alter an industry’s landscape, 
making it optimal to reallocate assets among firms through mergers and acquisitions.  
Additionally, innovations in financing have contributed to these waves by providing the 
funds required to pursue such transactions (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter 1988).  Corporate 
control activity has the ability to significantly alter m anagem ent’s authority over the firm  
as they are often replaced, and at a minimum lose influence, when their firm is acquired.  
Numerous studies have examined the actions employed by management to insulate their 
firm from the market for corporate control.  For example, Field and Karpoff (2002) study 
the frequency and effectiveness of antitakeover mechanisms in place at the time of the 
IPO. 
 The present study examines the relation between the first day returns to initial 
public offerings and the corporate control environment.  A number of studies, including 
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Zingales (1995), Brennan and Franks (1997), Mello and Parsons (1998), Stoughton and 
Z echner (1998) and B ebchuk (1999) exam ine the IP O  and its relation to the firm ’s post-
IPO ownership structure.  For example, Brennan and Franks posit that underpricing is 
used strategically by the issuer to influence the dispersion of shares in the aftermarket.  
This greater dispersion of shares results in the presence of fewer influential blockholders, 
resulting in a stronger controlling position for the manager-entrepreneur.  An active 
m arket for corporate control can m ake m anagem ent’s ability to m aintain control of the 
firm tenuous.  If management is threatened by the market for corporate control, they are 
forced to pursue other methods to strengthen their hold over the firm.  The hypothesis 
presented here is that underpricing is one mechanism used by management to maintain 
control of the firm, resulting in greater underpricing when the corporate control market is 
more active. 
 Utilizing over 2,300 new issues listed in the United States encompassing much of 
the 1990s, trends in new issues, underpricing and corporate control activity are 
documented across the sample period.  The primary result of this study identifies a 
positive relation between first day returns on initial public offerings and corporate control 
activity.  This relation is robust to the standard control variables employed in earlier 
underpricing studies including event specific characteristics and macroeconomic 
conditions. 
 The empirical analysis continues by demonstrating that firms taken public in 
active corporate control markets are significantly more likely to be acquired in the 
subsequent five years.  This relation between control activity and acquisition probability 
diminishes as the firm moves further from the IPO.  Additionally, initial returns and post-
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IPO institutional blockholdings are found to be negatively related.  Specifically, greater 
underpricing is associated with smaller post-IPO average and maximum institutional 
blockholdings on average.  Like the relation between pre-IPO control activity and the 
probability of being acquired, the relation between institutional blockholdings and first 
day returns weakens in the years following the IPO.  Hence, the benefits of underpricing 
are not infinitely lived, but appear to fade over time.  Finally, a positive relation between 
the probability of being acquired and average and maximum institutional blockholdings 
is documented.  Firms with larger institutional blocks in place following the IPO are 
more likely to be taken over up to five years after going public.  Together, these results 
support the hypothesis that managers underprice to influence ownership structure 
following the offering, w hich reduces the firm ’s exposure to the m arket for corporate 
control by reducing outside ow ners’ incentive to m onitor m anagem ent. 
 Zingales (1995) proposes that the IPO represents the first step in transferring 
ownership of the firm.  At first blush, the positive relation between corporate control 
activity and initial returns docum ented here m ight appear inconsistent w ith Z ingales’ 
hypothesis.  However, the hypothesis of Zingales and the explanation offered here are not 
mutually exclusive.  Instead of interpreting the results as indicative of management 
seeking to prevent all control activity from impacting the firm, a more inclusive 
interpretation is that management desires to maintain control of the firm to ensure that if 
the firm is acquired, the takeover is on terms which they deem favorable.  By maintaining 
control of the firm following the IPO, management is able to choose when and if the firm 
is acquired and can maximize the value of their controlling stake.  This interpretation is 
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also consistent with the theoretical papers of Mello and Parsons (1998) and Bebchuk 
(1999). 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 discusses previous 
research on the benefits of control, IPO underpricing, and corporate control related to this 
study.  Section 3 describes my sample construction process and the methodology utilized 
in the analysis.  Section 4 documents and interprets a strong, positive relation between 
corporate control activity and initial returns and presents evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that underpricing facilitates managerial control over the firm, while Section 5 
summarizes and concludes. 
2.  Previous research 
A.  Managerial control 
 Control of the firm, and the accompanying benefits, has a number of implications 
in finance research.  A large body of literature, centered on the work of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), examines the mechanisms designed to align the interests of controlling 
and minority shareholders.  Such mechanisms include firms-specific characteristics such 
as the board of directors, the design of managerial compensation plans, and the structure 
and size of managerial and block ownership positions as well as external influences such 
as the managerial labor market and the market for corporate control.  Each of these 
governance mechanisms plays a role in providing incentives for management to make 
decisions not only with their own interests in mind, but also the interests of other 
stakeholders of the firm, particularly shareholders.  For example, the market for corporate 
control is expected to align the interests of management and shareholders by reallocating 
underperforming resources to positions where their value may be maximized.  As the 
m arket for corporate control reallocates a firm ’s resources, the influence of the target 
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firm ’s m anagem ent is at a m inim um  significantly dim inished but often elim inated 
altogether (Jensen, 1988). 
 A primary area of study related to control explores the actions which managers 
and entrepreneurs take in an effort to maintain and strengthen their hold on the firm.  
Such actions include, but are not limited to, maintaining controlling ownership stakes 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), the implementation of dual class structures (Nenova, 2003), 
the configuration of the board of directors (Baker and Gompers, 2004), and 
diversification of the firm ’s operations (S hleifer and V ishny, 1989).  T he prim ary 
takeaway from the literature on control for the purposes of this study is that control has 
inherent value.    Because control has value, managers have incentive to take actions 
which allow them to maintain, or even strengthen, their control over firms.  The devices 
available depend on the environm ent in w hich the firm  operates and m anagem ent’s 
behavior is influenced by the mechanisms at their disposal which facilitate their goal to 
control the firm. 
A number of theoretical works consider issues of control while focusing on the 
firm ’s initial public offering and subsequent ow nership structure.  Z ingales (1995) 
hypothesizes that the IPO represents the first step in the transfer of control of the firm 
from  the entrepreneur to a new  ow ner.  In Z ingales’ m odel, the entrepreneur uses the IP O  
to assemble the ownership structure that allows him to maximize his proceeds in an 
eventual control transaction.  Z ingales’ m odel suggests that the value of cash flow  rights 
are maximized by selling to dispersed shareholders, for which the IPO is ideally suited.  
O n the contrary, the value of the entrepreneur’s control position is m axim ized by 
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bargaining directly with potential suitors, which is expected to occur subsequent to the 
IPO. 
Like Zingales, Mello and Parsons (1998) hypothesize that it is optimal to sell 
shares to small, dispersed investors at the time of the IPO with the transfer of control 
occurring at a later date.  By selling to small investors through the IPO, the seller gathers 
information that helps him maximize his proceeds in a subsequent control transaction.  
For example, the sale of shares to small investors in the IPO and subsequent trading in 
the secondary market establish a market price for the firm which may aid the 
entrepreneur in gauging demand and negotiating the sale of the control block.  
Alternatively, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) posit that the optimal strategy is to establish 
large blockholders as part of the IPO.  In their model, the presence of sizeable 
blockholders increases the value of the firm through increased monitoring of 
management, allowing for the sale of subsequent shares at a higher price. 
Bebchuk (1999) introduces the size of the private benefits of control into the 
discussion of ownership structure and the IPO.  Bebchuk hypothesizes that as the benefits 
of control become larger, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to maintain control of the firm 
to discourage outsiders from making the firm a target.  Additionally, like Zingales and 
Mello and Parsons, Bebchuk posits that maintaining control at the time of the IPO allows 
the initial owner to maximize his proceeds in a subsequent control transfer.  Finally, 
Bebchuk suggests two primary motivations for the use of antitakeover devices, to prevent 
unw anted acquisition attem pts and to increase the entrepreneur’s proceeds in a successful 
transfer of control. 
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B.  IPO underpricing 
 A significant amount of empirical research, dating back at least to Ibbotson’s 
(1975) study documents short-run underpricing of initial public offerings in the United 
States.  Similar studies present consistent evidence of short-run underpricing of initial 
public offerings in many international markets (Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist, 1994).  
In sum, the underpricing of IPOs across time and countries is well established.  IPO 
underpricing continues to interest investors, practitioners, and researchers who seek to 
explain why managers are willing to offer ownership stakes in the firm at an apparent 
discount. 
   Theories of IPO underpricing began to appear shortly after the introduction of the 
literature documenting the large initial returns to new issues.  Characteristics of the 
issuing firm, the issue, and the general market climate have all been cited as possible 
determinants of IPO underpricing.  Benveniste and Spindt (1989) hypothesize that 
underpricing is used to acquire information from potential purchasers of the issue.  As 
such, underpricing is partially a cost of acquiring information during the bookbuilding 
process.  Carter and Manaster (1990) conjecture that firms use prestigious underwriters to 
signal low risk in an effort to combat the effects of information asymmetry.  Consistent 
with their hypothesis, they find that firms using more reputable underwriters exhibit 
lower initial returns on average.  Additional theories of IPO underpricing include the 
“w inner’s curse” hypothesis of R ock (1986), inform ation cascades (W elch, 1992), legal 
liability avoidance (Tinic, 1988), an absence of motivation to avoid underpricing (Habib 
and L jungqvist, 2001) and “analyst lust” (L oughran and R itter, 2002). 
Brennan and Franks (1997) and Smart and Zutter (2003) present theoretical and 
empirical support for the notion that management uses underpricing as a mechanism to 
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maintain control.  Utilizing a sample of U.K. IPOs, Brennan and Franks present empirical 
evidence consistent with their hypothesis that underpricing is used to strategically 
influence a dispersed outside ownership structure, reducing the likelihood that ownership 
blocks are formed at the time of the issue.  By reducing the probability that ownership 
blocks are formed at the time of the offering, the likelihood of management maintaining 
effective control of the firm is increased, allowing them to continue to enjoy the private 
benefits that accompany the position of control.  While it is possible that ownership 
blocks are formed following the issue, the initial dispersed ownership structure makes it 
more costly to form these blocks.   
In a unique test of the B rennan and F ranks “reduced m onitoring hypothesis,” 
Smart and Zutter compare single- and dual-class issues in the United States and find 
lower levels of underpricing for dual-class offerings.  Their empirical results are 
consistent with the reduced monitoring hypothesis as managers of dual-class firms have a 
substitute mechanism at their disposal for maintaining control of the firm, namely the 
ownership of the class of stock imparting superior voting rights.  The presence of this 
substitute mechanism reduces the need to underprice shares since a dispersed ownership 
structure is no longer a necessity due to the superior voting rights stock which provides 
the control that management desires.  In effect, the dual-class structure guarantees this 
control, reducing the need for substitute mechanisms, such as IPO underpricing. 
Field and Karpoff (2002) provide additional evidence consistent with the reduced 
monitoring hypothesis.  In particular, the authors document that takeover defenses are 
employed by a significant number of firms at the time of the initial public offering and 
that these mechanisms are effective in allowing management to maintain control of the 
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firm.  Contrary to studies supporting the reduced monitoring hypothesis, Arugaslan, 
Cook, and Kieschnick (2004) conclude that monitoring is not a significant motivation for 
offer underpricing.  They argue that earlier tests fail to consider important determinants 
of underpricing and institutional ownership, most importantly firm size, which led to 
results supportive of the reduced monitoring hypothesis. 
 Boulton (2006) examines the relation between IPO underpricing and proxies for 
investor protection across a sample of 24 countries and nearly 4,700 events.  He identifies 
a positive relation between investor protection and first day returns which is interpreted 
as consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is a mechanism used by management 
to maintain control of the firm.  Boulton notes that investor protections weaken 
managerial control in a number of ways.  Two examples include shareholder rights which 
provide means for shareholders to discipline or remove poorly performing management 
and creditor rights which allow creditors to remove assets from managerial control in 
bankruptcy and remove management from their position of control when the firm 
defaults.  Because such protections threaten managerial control, management has the 
incentive to use substitute mechanisms to strengthen control over the firm when investor 
protection is strong, consistent with the positive relation between investor protection and 
underpricing. 
C.  The market for corporate control 
 The market for corporate control has spawned a rich literature examining topics 
including the motivations for pursuing takeovers and the steps pursued by management to 
defend against becoming a target.  A subset of the corporate control literature focuses on 
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merger waves and develops hypotheses aimed at explaining why control activity clusters 
over time and within industries.   
 Studies examining the motivations for takeovers have proposed a number of 
hypotheses, including:  synergy (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983, 1988), hubris (Roll, 
1986), and agency issues (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1989, 1991).  The primary 
distinction between the three competing explanations is the expected wealth effects of the 
event.  Mergers motivated by synergy are expected to result in positive aggregate wealth 
effects for the combined participants.  Hubris inspired events have an expected wealth 
effect of zero, with any gains realized by the target perfectly offset by losses to the 
bidding firm.  Finally, agency explanations predict negative net wealth effects, as positive 
gains to target firms are overwhelmed by the negative returns to bidder firm shareholders. 
 Finance offers a simple objective for management, maximize shareholder value.  
However, agency problems often result in misalignment of incentives between 
management and shareholders.  One way to realign the incentives of management and 
shareholders is to remove the underperforming managers from power and replace them 
with others who are better able to maximize shareholder value.  Corporate control events 
can facilitate this replacem ent by reallocating the firm ’s assets to an organization where 
they have a higher value.  However, management often loses a great deal in such events, 
as their position of control is usually eliminated.  This motivates management to take 
actions aimed at reducing the probability the firm will be taken over. 
DeAngelo and Rice (1983) examine the passage of antitakeover amendments 
generally thought to entrench management, including:  staggered boards, supermajority 
approval, fair merger price provisions, and lockup provisions.  Stulz (1988) shows that 
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increased control of voting rights by management decreases the value of the firm to a 
potential bidder.  In S tulz’s analysis, capital structure changes are used to concentrate 
voting rights in the hands of management, making capital structure a method for 
entrenching management by sheltering them from takeover activity.  Safieddine and 
Titman (1999) empirically examine targets of takeover activity that were successful in 
warding off overtures and find that a takeover is less likely to succeed when debt levels 
are significantly increased.  Finally, Field and Karpoff (2002) examine takeover defenses 
utilized by firms at the time of their initial public offering and find that the presence of a 
takeover defense is positively related to the firm remaining independent in the future.  
Overall, there is a rich body of research documenting various actions that management 
has at their disposal to avoid becoming the target of a takeover, including the use of 
poison pills, staggered boards, and dual-class structures.   
 A number of papers document and examine patterns in corporate control activity 
including time and industry clustering.  In a study of the active corporate control market 
of the 1980s, Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) attribute the takeover wave of that 
decade to relaxed antitrust enforcement, deregulation in a number of industries, and 
innovations in financing.  Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) cite additional factors inducing 
corporate control waves including energy price volatility and foreign competition.  
Harford (2005) finds support for the neoclassical model of takeover activity, concluding 
that clusters of takeover activity result when industries respond to economic, regulatory, 
and technological shocks.  Harford cites another important enabler, capital market 
liquidity, which provides the funds needed to reallocate assets when shocks make it 
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optimal to do so.  In sum, much like the literature examining hot issue markets for initial 
public offerings, it has been established that there are waves in corporate control activity. 
3.  Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
A.  Sample selection 
 The sample of initial public offerings is extracted from the Disclosure New Issues 
database from Disclosure, Inc.  All firm-commitment new issues for the period January 
1990 through September 1998 are included with the exception of dual-class firms, 
closed-end funds, unit offers, investment companies, real estate investment trusts, and 
limited partnerships which are typically excluded in underpricing studies.  Elimination of 
duplicate records and additional data requirements results in a final sample of 2,363 IPOs 
with a minimum offer price of $5. 
 The sample of corporate control announcements is extracted from Thomson 
F inancial’s SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database.  To be included in the construction 
of the corporate control activity proxies a deal must meet the following criteria:  a 
minimum deal value of $1 million, public or private target status, and a deal status of 
completed, unconditional, or withdrawn.  For the January 1989 through August 1998 
period, 23,068 deals met the selection criteria.  The resulting deals are used to construct 
3, 6, and 12-month proxies based on the number of deals and the total dollar volume of 
deals.  The deal based proxy is normalized by the number of Compustat-listed firms for 
the year in question, while the dollar based proxies are developed by normalizing the 
total dollar volume of deals by the market capitalization and the total asset base of all 
Compustat-listed firms for a given year.  These proxies are further refined to measure 
control activity within the Fama and French (1997) industry classifications. 
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 Institutional ow nership data is retrieved from  T hom son F inancial’s 
CDA/Spectrum (13f) Institutional Holdings database for the five years following each 
initial public offering.  Institutional ownership data is available for 2,055 firms for the 
quarter following the IPO.  The number of firms with institutional ownership data 
declines to 1,261 five years after the IPO event due to a number of factors including 
acquisitions, bankruptcies, and delistings.  The primary institutional ownership proxy 
utilized in this study is the percentage of the firm ’s shares held by the average 
institutional blockholder.  As an alternative proxy, a number of results are illustrated 
using the percentage of shares outstanding held by the largest institutional shareholder.  
These proxies are constructed one quarter following the IPO as well as one through five 
years later. 
B.  Descriptive Statistics 
 Figure 6 plots average underpricing and a measure of corporate control activity on 
a single graph for illustrative purposes.  In this case, the measure of corporate control is 
the number of merger and acquisition announcements in the prior three calendar months.  
The left axis and vertical bars correspond to average underpricing, while the right axis 
and square line represents corporate control activity.  Finally, a trendline detailing the 
evolution of underpricing across the sample period is presented.  Figure 6 details an 
increase in the level of corporate control activity during the sample period.  Additionally, 
the trendline illustrates a similar increase in average underpricing over the same 
timeframe.  To control for the effects of time, year dummy variables are included in the 
subsequent analysis. 
 37 
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for my sample of IPOs, corporate control 
transactions, and institutional ownership by year and industry.  Industry classifications in 
this table are identical to those utilized in Dyck and Zingales (2004) with the addition of a 
high tech industry classification using the hi-tech SIC codes identified by Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003).  For each year, the first row lists the number of initial public offerings in 
the industry, while the second row details average underpricing.  Row 3 presents the 
number of corporate control transactions in the industry, while row 4 details the 
percentage of the firm owned by the average institutional blockholder one year after the 
IPO event.  Table 9 shows results consistent with prior IPO and merger and acquisition 
studies in that the sample is dominated by the usual suspects, including the 
manufacturing, financial, services, and high tech industries.  Underpricing is consistent 
with prior studies, falling in the 8-20% range in most instances, while average 
institutional ownership generally falls between 1-2% of the firm one year after the IPO.  
To control for industry trends, industry dummy variables developed using the Fama and 
French industry classifications are utilized in the analysis.  Overall, the descriptive 
statistics illustrate that the sample is well represented by new issues and corporate control 
activity in various industries across the sample period. 
4.  Empirical Results 
A.  Relation between underpricing and corporate control activity 
 Table 10 details the results of three sets of regressions designed to examine the 
relation between IPO underpricing and the prevailing corporate control climate.  Proxies 
for corporate control activity are based on the number of deals (Panels A) as well as the 
aggregate deal value (Panels B and C).  Panel A normalizes the number of deal 
announcements by the number of Compustat-listed firms, Panel B normalizes aggregate 
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deal value by the total industry market capitalization, while the denominator of Panel C is 
the total asset base, each within the appropriate Fama and French industry grouping.  
Each panel exhibits the results for the control proxies based on merger and acquisition 
activity for the three, six and twelve months preceding the IPO event. 
 The IPO underpricing literature has identified a number of factors thought to be 
related to initial returns.  A standard proxy in IPO underpricing studies is the size of the 
IPO offering (Ritter, 1984).  Offer size may reflect a number of factors, including offer 
risk and information asymmetry.  To control for the effects of offer size, the log of the 
offer value is included as a control variable.  One possible alternative explanation for a 
relation between corporate control activity and IPO underpricing is capital market 
liquidity.  It may be the case that these events appear related because they are both 
associated with the availability of capital.  Two variables are included to control for this 
possibility.  T he capital m arket liquidity control represents “the spread betw een the 
average rate charged for com m ercial and industrial loans and the fed funds rate,” as 
reported in Harford (2005).4  A second control variable, the hot issue dummy, is 
motivated by studies documenting waves in IPO activity, including Ritter (1984).  
Motivated by the methodology utilized by Helwege and Liang (2004), this dummy is set 
to one when the three-month centered moving average of the number of new issues is in 
the top quintile, when measured over the sample period.   
Hanley (1993) demonstrates a positive relation between offer-price revision and 
initial returns.  Controls for offer price revision and positive price revisions are included 
to account for this empirical regularity.  A number of studies examine the characteristics 
of the investment bank, auditor and other participants in the IPO process.  Carter and 
                                                 
4 The author thanks Jarrad Harford for providing the data for constructing this variable. 
 39 
Manaster (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) find a negative relation between IPO 
underpricing and underwriter reputation.  As such, the Megginson-Weiss measure, 
labeled underwriter market share, is included in many subsequent regressions.  Barry, 
Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990) identify a negative relation between 
underpricing and venture capital backing.  More recently, Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
find a positive relation between the presence of venture capital backing and first day 
returns to new issues.  Likewise, Michaely and Shaw (1995) document a negative relation 
between auditor quality and initial returns.  Dummy variables denoting venture capital 
backing and the presence of a first tier auditor are included in the underpricing 
regressions based on these earlier studies. 
 Numerous deal characteristics are thought to be associated with underpricing.  
Dummies for equity carve-outs, reverse LBOs, and Nasdaq listed firms are included in all 
underpricing regressions.  Additionally, Field and Karpoff (2002) document the 
regularity with which firms utilize antitakeover provisions at the time of the IPO.  The 
presence of antitakeover provisions, which have the potential to insulate management 
from the market for corporate control, is identified with a dummy variable.  Bebchuk and 
Ferrell (2002) identify three states with relatively stringent antitakeover laws relative to 
the rest of the country.  A dummy variable identifies IPOs issued by firms headquartered 
in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.  Lastly, firms not anticipated to pay dividends 
and the market return over the 22 trading days prior to the IPO event are included as 
control variables. 
 Table 10, panel A presents the underpricing regressions utilizing the normalized 
number of deals in the three, six and twelve months leading up to the IPO as the proxy 
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for the corporate control climate.  The regressions present strong evidence of a positive 
relation between corporate control activity and initial returns for each of the measurement 
windows.  The magnitude of the coefficient is monotonically decreasing as the 
measurement window increases, suggesting that more recent control activity is more 
strongly related to initial returns.  Overall, these results suggest that when corporate 
control activity is high, initial returns are larger. 
 The control variables in Table 10, Panel A are generally either insignificant or 
consistent with prior empirical literature.  Larger offerings are underpriced less while 
offers that have a revised offer price exhibit larger initial returns, particularly those with 
an upward price revision.  Underpricing is typically greater during periods when a large 
number of firms are coming to the market for the first time, as measured by the hot issue 
dummy variable.  Generally, deals led by high reputation investment banks are 
underpriced more, as are venture capital backed deals.  The positive relation between 
investment bank reputation and underpricing is consistent with the reversal of this 
relation in the 1990s identified by Loughran and Ritter (2004).  Equity carveouts and 
reverse LBOs generally underprice less, while IPOs coming to market in the month 
following strong overall market returns exhibit larger initial returns, on average.  The 
remaining control variables are generally not statistically significant. 
 Table 10, Panels B and C present results in line with those discussed above for 
alternate proxies for corporate control, including aggregate deal value normalized by total 
industry market capitalization (Panel B) and aggregate industry asset base (Panel C).  
Overall, the results presented in Table 10 offer strong evidence of a positive relation 
between the corporate control climate and IPO underpricing.  These results are consistent 
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with the hypothesis that management uses underpricing as a means of maintaining control 
when taking the firm public by taking actions designed to create a dispersed outside 
ownership structure.  The remaining empirical results seek to determine if this is 
necessary and more importantly, if it is effective. 
B.  Corporate control climate and future takeover probability 
 Table 11 explores the probability of firm survival as a function of the pre-IPO 
market for corporate control as well as several additional variables identified in the 
literature thought to be related to the likelihood that a firm is a takeover target.  The first 
five columns of results utilize the normalized number of deals in the three months leading 
up to the offering as the proxy for activity in the control market, while the last five 
columns examine the aggregate deal value normalized by total industry assets over the 
prior six months.  Logistic regressions are presented with the dependent variable equal to 
one if the firm is acquired in the first through fifth year following the initial public 
offering.  Acquisitions are cumulative in the regressions, as a firm acquired in the first 
year is also coded as acquired in subsequent years.  Control variables include a dummy 
variable identifying firms backed by venture capital funding, the (log) size of the offer, a 
sales to price multiplier, a measure of underwriter quality, and dummy variables for 
Nasdaq-listed firms, firms listed in a strong antitakeover state and firms with antitakeover 
provisions in place at the time of the offering. 
 The results of Table 11 document a positive relation between the corporate 
control climate in the months preceding the IPO and the probability that a firm is 
subsequently acquired.  This result suggests that firms are more likely to be acquired in 
each of the first five years following an IPO when the market for corporate control is 
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active leading up to the offering, whether control activity is measured using the deal 
based or value based proxy.  The coefficient on the control proxy generally declines in 
magnitude as the examination period progresses from one to five years following the 
IPO.  This indicates that the market for corporate control prevailing at the time of the 
IP O , w hile related to the firm ’s ability to survive up to five years out, has stronger 
predictive ability in the short and medium term.  Of the control variables, only the 
antitakeover state dummy is significant in any of the regressions, suggesting that firms 
are less likely to be taken over in the first two years after going private when incorporated 
in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania or Ohio.  Overall, Table 11 confirms that the corporate 
control clim ate at the tim e of the IP O  is positively associated w ith the firm ’s likelihood of 
subsequent takeover.  If management recognizes this relation and desires to maintain 
control of the firm, they will take actions designed to decrease the likelihood of being 
acquired, or at a minimum, to allow them to determine the conditions of a future 
takeover. 
C .  U nderpricing’s role in a dispersed ow nership structure 
 The hypothesis presented here is that managers underprice IPOs to induce 
rationing.  Specifically, underpricing is used to discriminate against large bidders in an 
effort to bring about a dispersed outside ownership structure.  Table 12 examines the role 
of underpricing in post-IPO block ownership to determine if greater underpricing is 
associated with dispersed ownership structures.  The analysis in Table 12 represents 
ordinary least squares regressions of post-IP O  institutional ow nership on the IP O ’s initial 
return and several control variables thought to be related to ownership structure, 
particularly the (log) size of the offer, the reputation of the lead underwriter, and the 
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backing of venture capitalists.  The dependent variable in Panel A of Table 12 is the 
percentage of the firm ’s shares held by the average institutional blockholder in the 
quarter immediately following the IPO and one through five years subsequent to the IPO.  
P anel B  presents the results w hen using the percentage of the firm ’s shares held by the 
largest institutional blockholder subsequent to the IPO as the dependent variable. 
 Table 12, Panel A presents strong evidence that IPO underpricing and average 
institutional blockholdings are negatively related.  Put simply, greater underpricing is 
associated with smaller institutional blockholdings, on average, up to five years following 
an offering.  Panel B documents a negative relation between initial returns and the largest 
institutional blockholding up to one year following an event.  Additionally, the 
coefficient on the initial return generally decreases in magnitude in the years following 
the IPO.  This indicates that impact of IPO underpricing on institutional blockholdings 
diminishes as time passes.  However, the results indicate that underpricing is related to 
average institutional blockholdings up to five years after the IPO.  This is consistent with 
the m otivation for underpricing offered here and in B rennan and F ranks’ study, as 
underpricing is related to dispersed outside ownership subsequent to the IPO.  
Interestingly, the control variable measuring the size of the offer indicates that larger 
offers have smaller average institutional holdings but larger maximum blockholdings, on 
average.  Additionally, venture backed deals tend to have larger average and maximum 
institutional holdings.  Overall, Table 12 presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis 
that underpricing is associated with a dispersed outside ownership structure.  This 
evidence strengthens the hypothesis that underpricing is used strategically by 
management in an effort to maintain control of the firm. 
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D.  Underpricing and survival 
 Tables 10 through 12 establish the following empirical regularities:  IPOs are 
underpriced more on average when the market for corporate control is active, the pre-IPO 
m arket for corporate control is related to a firm ’s ability to survive in subsequent years, 
and IPO underpricing is associated with smaller post-IPO institutional blockholdings.  
These results provide the motivation for the hypothesis that IPO underpricing is utilized 
by management to maintain control when the corporate control climate threatens their 
hold on the firm.  To complete the story, the relation between institutional ownership and 
firm survival must be established.  Table 13 examines the relation between firm survival 
and institutional ownership, which represents the mechanism through with management 
attempts to maintain control.  The dependent variable in the logistic regressions in Table 
13 is set to one if the firm is acquired within the period under examination (two through 
five years post-IPO, year one is not considered due to the very small number of takeovers 
within the first year for sample firms) and zero otherwise.  The predictive variables 
include post-IPO blockholdings and many of the control variables discussed in the 
presentation of the Table 11 results relating pre-IP O  control activity to a firm ’s 
probability of survival. 
 The results of Table 13 dem onstrate that a firm ’s probability of takeover up to 
five years subsequent to the IPO event is related to institutional blockholdings, as larger 
blockholdings are positively associated with the probability of takeover.  This is true 
whether blockholdings are measured as average institutional holdings (Panel A) or 
maximum institutional blockholding (Panel B).  The monotonic decline in the magnitude 
of the blockholding coefficient in the regressions in Table 13 aligns with intuition, as 
blockholdings immediately following the IPO become less important as time passes.  
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Overall, the results of Table 13 complete the story, as underpricing is related to smaller 
blockholdings (Table 12) and smaller blockholdings are related to lower takeover 
probability (Table 13). 
5.  Conclusions 
 While controlling for factors identified in the literature as associated with initial 
returns, IPO underpricing is found to be positively related to activity in the market for 
corporate control.  The results hold for various proxies for corporate control activity, and 
are both economically and statistically significant.  In addition to documenting the 
relation between underpricing and corporate control activity, I demonstrate that firms 
taken public in active corporate control markets are significantly more likely to be 
acquired in subsequent years.  Additionally, greater underpricing is associated with 
smaller institutional blockholdings on average, confirming that underpricing is related to 
the ownership structure of the firm in the years following the IPO. 
 The remaining empirical results demonstrate that a firm is more likely to be 
acquired in the five years following the initial public offering when institutional holdings 
are larger.  Together, these results imply that underpricing is effective in strengthening 
managerial control, at least to the degree that they are less likely to lose their position due 
to takeover.  The results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis of Brennan and 
Franks (1997) which posits that IPO underpricing is used strategically by the issuer to 
influence the dispersion of shares in the aftermarket.  This greater dispersion of shares 
results in the presence of fewer influential blockholders, resulting in a stronger 
controlling position for the manager.  When the corporate control climate is active, 
m anagem ent’s position w ith the firm  is at risk.  M anagers w ho seek to take their firm  
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public during an active period of corporate control may utilize underpricing to influence 
the ownership structure of the firm in an effort to protect their position of control. 
The results presented here are also consistent with various studies examining 
issues of ownership structure related to the IPO.  Zingales (1995) and Mello and Parsons 
(1998) hypothesize that one goal of the IPO is the creation of a dispersed outside 
ownership structure.  A dispersed outside ownership structure facilitates managerial 
control over the firm, while also allowing management to determine the terms under 
which a transfer of control should take place.  In the presence of an active corporate 
control market, a dispersed outside ownership structure becomes more important for 
maintaining managerial control.  In the context of this paper, underpricing is a substitute 
mechanism which allows management to maintain or even strengthen control over the 
firm, providing management with the ability to direct the terms of any attempt to acquire 
the firm. 
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Table 1 - Average International Sample IPO Underpricing 
The sample is all IPO events occurring during the period 2000-2004. The sample of countries is formed by 
the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) studies.  Table 1 lists the number of sample IPOs as well as the average IPO underpricing by listing 
country. 
 
 
 
Country IPOs Underpricing
Australia 402 22.54%
Austria 15 21.04%
Canada 6 23.39%
Denmark 10 14.33%
Finland 15 19.45%
France 222 14.13%
Germany 171 40.54%
Hong Kong 380 17.59%
Indonesia 45 43.18%
Italy 67 9.34%
Japan 771 50.65%
Malaysia 233 42.30%
Norway 17 5.34%
New Zealand 27 15.60%
Philippines 18 14.05%
Singapore 251 21.92%
S. Korea 232 70.23%
Spain 10 12.08%
Sweden 29 5.80%
Switzerland 25 12.01%
Thailand 94 26.51%
Taiwan 333 1.90%
UK 372 26.40%
US 953 30.26%
All IPOs 4698 30.46%
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Table 2 - Description of International Governance Proxies 
The following table details the variables developed outside of this study and utilized as proxies for 
governance in the analysis presented here.  The author thanks to LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny for providing access to their variables through the authors’ w ebsites. 
 
Variable Description Predicted Relation with 
Underpricing 
Accounting 
standards 
(account) 
“Index created by exam ining and rating com panies’ 1990 
annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items.  
These items fall into seven categories (general information, 
income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, 
accounting standards, stock data, and special items).  A 
minimum of three companies in each country were studied.  
The companies represent a cross section of various industry 
groups; industrial companies represented 70 percent, and 
financial com panies the rem aining 30 percent.”  L aP orta et 
al. (1998) derived from International accounting and 
auditing trends, Center for International Financial Analysis 
and Research. 
Positive 
Anti-director 
rights 
(nant_dir) 
“A n index of anti-director rights is formed by adding one 
when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their 
proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit 
their shares prior to the General S hareholders’ M eeting; (3) 
cumulative voting or proportional representation of 
minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (4) an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an E xtraordinary S hareholders’ 
Meeting is less than or equal to 10%; or (6) when 
shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be 
w aived by a shareholders’ m eeting.  T he range for the index 
ranges from  zero to six”  L aP orta et al. (1998). 
Positive 
CEO turnover 
(ceo_turnover) 
Aggregate CEO turnover is constructed by country for the 
period 1993-1998 using a CEO turnover database provided 
by Hazem Daouk.  The aggregate turnover number is then 
normalized by the number of publicly listed firms as of the 
year 1996.  CEO turnover is analyzed from the country of 
origin perspective. 
Positive 
Creditor rights 
(cred_ind) 
“Index aggregating creditor rights.  T he index is form ed by 
adding 1 when: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as 
creditors’ consent or minimum dividends, to file for 
reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain 
possession of their security once the reorganization petition 
has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) the debtor does 
not retain the administration of its property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization; (4) secured creditors are 
ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result 
from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm.  The 
index ranges from  0 to 4.”  L aP orta et al. (1998) 
Positive 
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Table 2 - continued 
 
Democracy 
score 
(democ) 
“A  source of the degree of dem ocracy in a given country 
based on:  (1) the competitiveness of political participation; 
(2) the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment; and (3) the constraints on the chief executive.  
The variable ranges from zero to ten, where higher values 
equal a higher degree of institutionalized democracy.  This 
variable is calculated as the average from 1960 through 
2001.”  L aP orta et al. (2006) as reported in Jaggers and 
Marshall (2000). 
Positive 
Disclosure 
(disclose) 
Disclosure requirements index consisting of the following 
com ponents:  (1) “the law  prohibits selling securities that 
are going to be listed on the largest stock exchange of the 
country without delivering a prospectus to potential 
investors”; (2) “prospectus disclosure requirem ents 
regarding the com pensation of directors and key officers”; 
(3) “disclosure requirem ents regarding the issuer’s equity 
ow nership structure”; (4) “prospectus disclosure 
requirements regarding the equity ow nership of the issuer’s 
shares by its directors and key officers”; (5) prospectus 
disclosure requirem ents regarding the issuer’s contracts 
outside the ordinary course of business”; (6) “prospectus 
disclosure requirements regarding transactions between the 
issuer and its directors, officers and/or large shareholders.”  
LaPorta et al. (2006). 
Positive –  disclosure 
represents a proxy for 
governance 
 
Negative –  disclosure 
represents a proxy for 
issue uncertainty 
Efficiency of 
judiciary 
(eff_jud) 
“A ssessm ent of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment as it affects business, particularly foreign 
firm s” produced by the country risk rating agency 
International C ountry R isk (IC R ).  It m ay be “taken to 
represent investors’ assessm ent of conditions in the country 
in question.”  A verage betw een 1980 and 1983.  S cale from  
0 to 10, with lower scores representing lower efficiency 
levels.”  L aP orta et al. (2006) derived from  International 
Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Services (1996)). 
Positive 
M&A activity 
(ma_deals) 
Corporate control activity is measured for each country and 
year in the sample by retrieving the number of completed 
m ergers and acquisitions from  T hom son F inancial’s S D C  
Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions Database.  This number 
is normalized by the number of publicly listed firms as of 
the year 2000.  The M&A control variable is measured 
from the country of origin perspective. 
Positive 
Property rights 
(f_prop97) 
“ A  rating of property rights in each country (on a scale  
from 1 to 5) in year 1997.  The more protection private 
property receives, the higher the score.  The score is based, 
broadly, on the degree of legal protection of private 
property, the extent to which the government protects and 
enforces laws that protect private property, the probability 
that the government will expropriate private property, and 
the country’s legal protection to private property.”  L aP orta 
et al. (2006) as reported in Index of Economic Freedom 
(1997). 
Positive 
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Table 2 - continued 
 
Public 
enforcement 
(publ_enf) 
Public enforcement index consisting of the following 
components:  (1) appointment, tenure and focus 
characteristics of the supervisor (where supervisor is the 
individual or agency w ith prim ary oversight of a country’s 
main stock exchange); (2) authority and power of 
supervisor to make rules related to offerings and listings; 
(3) investigative powers of the supervisor; (4) ability of 
supervisor to order issuer, distributor and accountant to take 
actions in the event of a defective prospectus; (5) criminal 
sanctions available to issuers, distributors and accounts 
when financial statements are deemed deficient.  LaPorta et 
al. (2006) 
Positive 
Rule of law 
(rulelaw_2000) 
“R ule of law  m easures the extent to w hich agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society in year 2000.  
These include perceptions of the incidence of both violent 
and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability 
of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.”  
LaPorta et al. (2006).  Data source is Kaufmann, Daniel, 
Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, 2003. 
Positive 
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Table 3 - International Variable Summary Statistics 
The following table lists the values for the governance proxies and average values for the control variables utilized in the empirical analysis by country.  The 
sample of countries is formed by the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) studies.  The data 
for the governance proxies included in panel A have been provided by LaPorta, Lopez-de-S ilanes, S hleifer and V ishny through the authors’ w ebsites w ith the 
exception of the corporate control and CEO turnover proxies which were developed for the purposes of this study.  Panel B illustrates the mean values for the 
control variables utilized in this study by country.  The cross sectional mean and standard deviation for each variable are presented in the final rows. 
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Table 3 Panel A – Country Level Governance Proxies 
 
Country IPOs account ceo_turnover cred_ind democ disclose eff_jud f_prop97 ma_deals nant_dir publ_enf rule_law
Australia 402 75 0.09 1 10.00 0.75 10.00 5 0.20 4 0.90 10.00
Austria 15 54 0.30 3 10.00 0.25 9.50 5 0.13 2 0.17 10.00
Canada 6 74 0.15 1 10.00 0.92 9.25 5 0.12 5 0.80 10.00
Denmark 10 62 0.24 3 10.00 0.58 10.00 5 0.11 2 0.37 10.00
Finland 15 77 0.85 1 10.00 0.50 10.00 5 0.14 3 0.32 10.00
France 222 69 0.35 0 7.95 0.75 8.00 4 0.17 3 0.77 8.98
Germany 171 62 0.43 3 10.00 0.42 9.00 5 0.11 1 0.22 9.23
Hong Kong 380 69 0.05 4 0.92 10.00 5 0.15 5 0.87 8.22
Indonesia 45 4 0.57 0.50 2.50 3 0.07 2 0.62 3.98
Italy 67 62 0.86 2 10.00 0.67 6.75 4 0.21 1 0.48 8.33
Japan 771 65 0.45 2 10.00 0.75 10.00 5 0.12 4 0.00 8.98
Malaysia 233 76 0.07 4 5.81 0.92 9.00 4 0.06 4 0.77 6.78
New Zealand 27 70 0.11 3 10.00 0.67 10.00 5 0.24 4 0.33 10.00
Norway 17 74 0.39 2 10.00 0.58 10.00 5 0.15 4 0.32 10.00
Philippines 18 65 0 4.54 0.83 4.75 4 0.07 3 0.83 2.73
Singapore 251 78 0.10 4 2.45 1.00 10.00 5 0.12 4 0.87 8.57
South Korea 232 62 0.06 3 0.75 6.00 5 0.07 2 0.25 5.35
Spain 10 64 0.27 2 6.05 0.50 6.25 4 0.03 4 0.33 7.80
Sweden 29 83 0.40 2 10.00 0.58 10.00 4 0.21 3 0.50 10.00
Switzerland 25 68 0.43 1 10.00 0.67 10.00 5 0.10 2 0.33 10.00
Taiwan 333 65 2 0.75 6.75 0.05 3 0.52 8.52
Thailand 94 64 3 3.82 0.92 3.25 5 0.12 2 0.72 6.25
United Kingdom 372 78 0.32 4 10.00 0.83 10.00 5 0.10 5 0.68 8.57
United States 953 71 0.17 1 10.00 1.00 10.00 5 0.11 5 0.90 10.00
Cross Sectional Mean 195.75 69.77 0.24 2.26 8.81 0.82 9.11 4.85 0.12 3.90 0.60 8.74
Std Deviation 247.31 5.33 0.18 1.28 2.44 0.15 1.66 0.39 0.06 1.14 0.34 1.34  
 58 
 
Table 3 Panel B – Control Variables 
 
Country stturnover integer offer_size ipo_activity return3
Australia 0.70 0.23 15.65 -2.65 0.04
Austria 0.28 0.60 17.19 -2.93 -0.01
Canada 0.63 0.17 15.29 -7.51 0.05
Denmark 0.78 0.90 17.25 -4.01 0.03
Finland 0.71 0.67 16.29 -2.75 0.11
France 0.78 0.35 15.22 -2.57 0.01
Germany 0.87 0.79 17.21 -2.43 0.01
Hong Kong 0.49 0.13 16.38 -2.30 0.00
Indonesia 1.85 1.00 15.81 -3.35 0.07
Italy 1.01 0.55 17.63 -2.76 -0.02
Japan 0.79 1.00 16.32 -2.78 -0.02
Malaysia 0.32 0.07 14.97 -2.70 0.03
New Zealand 0.39 0.41 16.37 -2.57 0.03
Norway 0.98 0.94 17.58 -3.54 0.06
Philippines 0.11 0.28 14.84 -4.00 0.01
Singapore 0.54 0.00 15.79 -2.01 0.01
South Korea 2.56 1.00 16.74 -2.31 0.05
Spain 1.82 0.20 19.77 -5.90 -0.04
Sweden 1.11 0.97 17.62 -3.40 -0.06
Switzerland 0.76 1.00 18.27 -3.40 -0.02
Taiwan 2.07 0.87 15.64 -2.01 0.03
Thailand 1.02 0.61 16.26 -2.67 0.06
United Kingdom 0.97 0.88 20.76 -3.04 -0.01
United States 1.70 0.86 18.60 -3.38 0.01
Cross Sectional Mean 1.12 0.65 16.98 -2.76 0.01
Std Deviation 0.75 0.48 2.13 0.72 0.11
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Table 4 - International Variable Correlation Matrix 
The sample consists of the country-level governance proxies and control variables for sample countries with at least one IPO occurring during the period 2000-
2004.  Many of the country-level corporate governance proxies were made available by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny.   
   
account ceo_turn cred_ind democ disclose eff_jud f_prop97 ma_deals nant_dir publ_enf rule_law stturnover integer offer_size ipo_act return3
account 1.000
ceo_turn -0.400 1.000
cred_ind 0.181 -0.165 1.000
democ -0.293 0.353 -0.489 1.000
disclose 0.475 -0.525 -0.013 -0.195 1.000
eff_jud 0.492 -0.004 -0.070 0.522 0.291 1.000
f_prop97 -0.099 -0.119 0.010 0.429 0.192 0.457 1.000
ma_deals 0.134 0.068 -0.245 0.180 -0.087 0.269 0.046 1.000
nant_dir 0.581 -0.346 -0.027 0.250 0.734 0.696 0.323 0.061 1.000
publ_enf 0.651 -0.647 -0.078 -0.247 0.629 0.122 -0.104 0.118 0.448 1.000
rule_law 0.251 0.180 -0.555 0.684 0.137 0.718 0.404 0.348 0.444 0.198 1.000
stturnover -0.300 -0.154 -0.245 0.229 0.077 -0.353 0.133 -0.232 -0.119 -0.001 -0.083 1.000
integer -0.349 0.374 -0.206 0.448 -0.164 -0.086 0.208 -0.188 -0.070 -0.429 0.065 0.383 1.000
offer_size 0.199 0.117 0.035 0.334 0.191 0.223 0.270 -0.070 0.316 0.132 0.213 0.182 0.298 1.000
ipo_act -0.126 -0.085 0.278 -0.266 -0.158 -0.174 0.026 0.161 -0.280 -0.110 -0.229 -0.137 -0.169 -0.283 1.000
return3 0.002 -0.136 0.004 -0.094 -0.015 -0.137 -0.035 0.036 -0.083 0.068 -0.093 0.034 -0.049 -0.016 0.066 1.000
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Table 5 - Univariate Examination of IPO Underpricing by Governance Proxy 
The sample is all IPO events occurring during the period 2000-2004. The sample of countries is formed by 
the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) studies.  The mean value for each governance proxy is presented in the second column, while 
average underpricing for sample events occurring in a country at or above the mean (column 3) and below 
the mean (column 4) is listed.  The final column presents the p-value from a t-test examining the equality of 
the mean underpricing for above and below the mean sample events. 
 
Average Underpricing
Governance measure Mean Value >= Mean < Mean p-value
Accounting standards 69.78 27.85% 32.98% 0.0098
Antidirector rights 3.90 32.02% 26.28% 0.0119
CEO turnover 0.24 33.57% 28.38% 0.0114
Creditor rights 2.26 33.01% 28.84% 0.0483
Democracy score 8.81 33.40% 25.80% 0.0001
Disclosure 0.82 27.56% 33.26% 0.0041
Efficiency of judiciary 9.11 30.81% 29.67% 0.6075
M&A activity 0.12 34.38% 27.36% 0.0005
Property rights 4.85 33.78% 17.49% 0.0000
Public enforcement 0.60 26.12% 37.97% 0.0000
Rule of law 8.74 33.38% 26.64% 0.0008
 
 61 
Table 6 - IPO Underpricing as a Function of Single Governance Proxy 
The sample is all IPO events occurring during the period 2000-2004. The sample of countries is formed by 
the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) studies.  Control variables include a liquidity proxy, uncertainty proxy (integer offer price), the (log) 
size of the offering measured in U.S. dollars, the IPO issue climate measured as the (log) ratio of the 
number of IPOs in the issue year to the number of listed firms as of 2000 and the local market returns in the 
three months leading up to the month of the IPO.  Governance proxies include those presented in prior 
tables.  In addition, proxies for the corporate control climate and CEO turnover markets have been 
developed for the purposes of this study. 
 
Table 6 Panel A 
 
 
Governance Index Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 0.6286 0.7806 0.7026 1.1825 0.6214 0.9524
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Country liquidity 0.0372 0.0340 0.0420 0.1772 0.0542 0.0688
(0.0097) (0.0478) (0.0038) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Integer offer price 0.1361 0.1303 0.1440 0.1275 0.1529 0.1671
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log offer size (US dollars) -0.0299 -0.0284 -0.0337 -0.0472 -0.0379 -0.0405
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log IPO activity 0.0075 0.0046 0.0160 0.1096 -0.0267 0.0853
(0.6366) (0.7739) (0.3225) (0.0000) (0.1145) (0.0000)
Recent market returns 0.7331 0.7764 0.7528 0.9844 0.7537 0.9554
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Accounting standards -0.0016
(0.4884)
Antidirectors index 0.0220
(0.0232)
CEO turnover 0.0473
(0.0046)
Creditors index 0.0484
(0.0000)
Democracy score 0.0098
(0.0592)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0364 0.0364 0.0373 0.0827 0.0422 0.0679
Observations 4698 4653 4698 4046 4698 3753
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Table 6 Panel B 
 
Governance Index Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Intercept 0.6729 0.5157 0.9404 0.7874 0.7498 0.7031
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Country liquidity 0.0352 0.0667 0.0608 0.1116 0.0567 0.0445
(0.0153) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0030)
Integer offer price 0.1431 0.1424 0.1406 0.1737 0.0285 0.1365
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2986) (0.0000)
Log offer size (US dollars) -0.0311 -0.0363 -0.0330 -0.0439 -0.0215 -0.0325
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log IPO activity 0.0095 0.0226 -0.0018 0.0883 -0.0143 0.0115
(0.5484) (0.1586) (0.9091) (0.0000) (0.3679) (0.4691)
Recent market returns 0.7394 0.7770 0.7303 0.8729 0.7694 0.7449
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Disclosure standards 0.0735
(0.3107)
Efficiency of judiciary 0.0341
(0.0000)
M&A activity 0.1092
(0.0000)
Property rights index 0.0558
(0.0518)
Public enforcement -0.2713
0.0000
Rule of law 0.0338
(0.0890)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0364 0.0412 0.0442 0.0723 0.0481 0.0368
Observations 4698 4698 4561 4365 4698 4698
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Table 7 - IPO Underpricing as a Function of Multiple Governance Proxies 
The sample is all IPO events occurring during the period 2000-2004. The sample of countries is formed by 
the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) studies.  Control variables include a liquidity proxy, uncertainty proxy (integer offer price), the (log) 
size of the offering measured in U.S. dollars, the IPO issue climate measured as the (log) ratio of the 
number of IPOs in the issue year to the number of listed firms as of 2000 and the local market returns in the 
three months leading up to the month of the IPO.  Governance proxies include those presented in prior 
tables.  In addition, proxies for the corporate control and CEO turnover markets have been developed for 
the purposes of this study. 
 
Governance Index Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 0.6621 0.9497 0.8767 0.5185 0.9210 1.0282 0.6543 0.6671
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0516)
Country liquidity 0.0902 0.2339 0.1127 0.1045 0.1213 0.1584 0.0933 0.2234
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Integer offer price 0.0326 0.0342 0.0787 0.0438 0.0410 0.0794 0.0346 0.0507
(0.2436) (0.2912) (0.0082) (0.1219) (0.1436) (0.0078) (0.2183) (0.1275)
Log offer size (US dollars) -0.0363 -0.0528 -0.0503 -0.0382 -0.0405 -0.0451 -0.0375 -0.0445
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log IPO activity -0.0226 0.0676 0.0515 -0.0226 -0.0462 0.0649 -0.0233 0.0642
(0.1871) (0.0010) (0.0141) (0.1887) (0.0079) (0.0008) (0.1748) (0.0200)
Recent market returns 0.8543 1.1007 1.1155 0.8588 0.8448 0.9760 0.8566 1.2262
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Antidirectors index 0.0647 0.0698 0.0687 0.0378 0.0551 0.0615 0.0606 0.0488
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0130) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0144)
Creditors index 0.0382 0.0391 0.0457 0.0428 0.0541 0.0298 0.0405 0.0432
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0023)
Public enforcement -0.3530 -0.3331 -0.2579 -0.3159 -0.3429 -0.3178 -0.3467 -0.3398
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CEO turnover 0.0540 -0.1697
(0.5972) (0.2136)
Democracy score 0.0088 0.0017
(0.1928) (0.8637)
Efficiency of judiciary 0.0245 0.0016
(0.0133) (0.9707)
M&A activity 0.1382 0.0817
(0.0000) (0.0269)
Property rights index -0.0177 0.1802
(0.5684) (0.0506)
Rule of law 0.0170 -0.2544
(0.4664) (0.0006)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0591 0.1012 0.0897 0.0602 0.0702 0.0881 0.0591 0.1062
Observations 4698 4046 3753 4698 4561 4365 4698 3510
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Table 8 - Decomposition of Governance Indexes 
The sample is all IPO events occurring during the period 2000-2004. The sample of countries is formed by 
the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) studies.  Control variables include a liquidity proxy, uncertainty proxy (integer offer price), the (log) 
size of the offering measured in U.S. dollars, the IPO issue climate measured as the (log) ratio of the 
number of IPOs in the issue year to the number of listed firms as of 2000 and the local market returns in the 
three months leading up to the month of the IPO.   
Table 8 Panel A:  Antidirector Rights Index Components 
The components of the antidirector rights index include the following (LaPorta et al (1998)):  (1) the 
country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their 
shares prior to the general shareholders meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of 
minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders 
meeting is less than or equal to ten percent and (6) when shareholders have preemptive rights that can only 
be waved by a shareholders meeting. 
 
Antidirector Rights Components Model
Intercept 0.4997
(0.0000)
Country liquidity 0.1017
(0.0000)
Integer offer price 0.1422
(0.0000)
Offer size (US dollars) -0.0285
(0.0000)
Log IPO activity 0.0052
(0.7794)
Recent market returns 0.7653
(0.0000)
Mail proxies -0.1520
(0.0000)
Shares blocked before meeting 0.2864
(0.0000)
Cumulative voting -0.1898
(0.0000)
Oppressed minority mechanism 0.0335
(0.4389)
< 10% votes to call meeting 0.0617
(0.3473)
Preemptive rights -0.0924
(0.0032)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0616
Observations 4698  
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Table 8 Panel B:  Creditor Rights Index Components 
The components of the creditor rights index include the following (LaPorta et al (1998)):  (1) the country 
imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or m inim um  dividends, to file for reorganization, (2) 
secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been 
approved (no automatic stay), (3) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization, and (4) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds 
that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. 
 
Creditor Rights Components Model
Intercept 0.5689
(0.0000)
Country liquidity 0.1361
(0.0000)
Integer offer price 0.0676
(0.0068)
Offer size (US dollars) -0.0354
(0.0000)
Log IPO activity 0.0050
(0.7812)
Recent market activity 0.8752
(0.0000)
Chapter 11 restrictions 0.0873
(0.0201)
No automatic stay on assets -0.2513
(0.0000)
Securited creditors first 0.1034
(0.0218)
Management does not stay 0.3306
(0.0000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0786
Observations 4698
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Table 8 Panel C:  Public Enforcement Index Components 
The components of the public enforcement index include the following (LaPorta et al (2006)):  (1) 
supervisor characteristics including whether a majority of members of main government agency in charge 
of supervision stock exchanges (supervisor) are appointed by the Executive branch of government, the 
supervisor cannot be dismissed at will of the appointing authority and separate agencies supervise 
commercial banks and stock exchanges, (2) rule-making power of the supervisor including the ability to 
issue regulations regarding primary offerings and listing rules without prior approval of governmental 
authorities, (3) investigative powers, including the power of the supervisor to command documents when 
investigating a violation of securities laws and to subpoena the testimony of witnesses when investigating a 
violation of securities laws and (4) criminal sanctions including the ability to hold issuers, distributors and 
accountants held liable for misleading prospectuses. 
 
Public enforcement index components Model
Intercept 0.9719
(0.0000)
Country liquidity 0.1154
(0.0000)
Integer offer price 0.0542
(0.0584)
Log Offer size (US dollars) -0.0341
(0.0000)
Log IPO activity 0.0199
(0.2588)
Recent market returns 0.7778
(0.0000)
Supervisor characteristics index -0.2326
(0.0000)
Rule-making power index -0.3184
(0.0000)
Investigative powers index 0.2352
(0.0006)
Orders index 0.1682
(0.0076)
Criminal index -0.2521
(0.0000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0779
Observations 4698
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Table 9 - Domestic Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample is all U.S. IPO events with an offer price greater than or equal to $5 occurring during the period 
January 1990 through September 1998.  The sample of control transactions is all public or private target 
firms, total deal value of over $1 million and a completed, pending or withdrawn status.  Average 
underpricing represents the simple average over all IPOs.  Industry classifications correspond to those 
utilized in Dyck and Zingales (2004) with the addition of a hi-tech classification using the hi-tech SIC 
codes identified in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). 
 
Agri Mini Cons Manu Tran Whol Reta Fina Serv Hi Te
1990 IPO # 0 9 3 17 4 3 5 3 8 15
Avg Underpricing 0.00% 3.01% 3.82% 10.46% 20.38% 13.27% 6.92% 1.78% 10.34% 16.07%
M&A # 6 87 16 446 141 63 62 289 174 187
Institutional 0.00% 1.65% 1.29% 1.26% 1.10% 0.57% 1.78% 0.84% 1.71% 1.14%
1991 IPO # 0 0 2 53 7 11 29 28 60 42
Avg Underpricing 0.00% 0.00% -3.13% 12.39% 6.25% 7.74% 8.18% 8.18% 9.87% 15.92%
M&A # 6 81 14 362 124 52 61 289 168 164
Institutional 0.00% 0.00% 0.50% 1.23% 0.96% 1.27% 1.41% 1.01% 1.16% 1.20%
1992 IPO # 0 5 5 108 13 14 41 38 47 55
Avg Underpricing 0.00% -1.18% 7.53% 9.40% 5.64% 8.94% 9.60% 7.11% 10.06% 15.87%
M&A # 15 62 15 335 152 61 70 391 236 177
Institutional 0.00% 1.87% 0.89% 1.39% 2.45% 1.57% 1.51% 1.26% 1.40% 1.31%
1993 IPO # 1 14 6 120 34 18 33 33 35 79
Avg Underpricing 2.08% 3.46% 1.49% 9.20% 9.51% 9.30% 21.58% 7.45% 12.95% 17.14%
M&A # 12 73 17 435 164 101 93 604 291 212
Institutional 2.59% 2.29% 1.51% 1.44% 1.23% 1.25% 1.83% 1.53% 1.17% 1.36%
1994 IPO # 0 8 2 95 16 14 20 16 46 64
Avg Underpricing 0.00% 6.03% 3.79% 6.31% 7.99% 12.60% 12.52% 4.94% 7.13% 16.72%
M&A # 8 84 29 569 220 123 150 711 375 310
Institutional 0.00% 0.70% 2.41% 1.67% 1.39% 1.94% 1.67% 1.53% 1.53% 1.49%
1995 IPO # 1 4 1 76 15 11 15 24 44 114
Avg Underpricing -1.67% 4.42% 9.13% 9.40% 9.97% 15.53% 13.60% 16.95% 18.19% 35.49%
M&A # 8 72 20 679 250 125 138 681 399 386
Institutional 0.00% 0.54% 4.94% 1.39% 1.18% 1.77% 1.43% 1.56% 1.50% 1.18%
1996 IPO # 0 13 3 109 20 15 27 25 90 121
Avg Underpricing 0.00% 8.47% 10.83% 9.93% 11.08% 18.44% 17.81% 13.79% 16.23% 25.23%
M&A # 11 115 31 717 282 160 174 793 547 493
Institutional 0.00% 1.95% 1.16% 1.56% 1.35% 1.56% 1.77% 1.55% 1.51% 1.40%
1997 IPO # 0 8 4 65 16 7 18 24 48 86
Avg Underpricing 0.00% 8.14% 14.99% 8.25% 15.42% 19.78% 10.55% 12.44% 13.78% 20.58%
M&A # 9 134 40 772 302 195 205 865 654 544
Institutional 0.00% 1.93% 1.44% 1.58% 1.38% 1.77% 1.56% 1.47% 1.47% 1.16%
1998 IPO # 0 0 3 8 8 6 6 15 17 23
Avg Underpricing 0.00% 0.00% 7.21% 18.29% 12.27% 13.71% 11.80% 5.09% 16.20% 22.00%
M&A # 11 67 45 511 185 115 105 719 387 426
Institutional 0 0 2.07% 0.88% 0.84% 1.21% 1.33% 1.61% 1.24% 1.39%
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Table 10 - IPO Underpricing as a Function of Corporate Control Activity 
 
The sample is all U.S. IPO events with an offer price greater than or equal to $5 occurring during the period 
January 1990 through September 1998.  The sample of control transactions is all public or private target 
firms, total deal value of over $1 million and a completed, pending, or withdrawn status.  Panels A utilizes 
a deal based proxy, while Panels B and C utilized value based proxies.  Additional variables include the 
offer value (in millions), the rate spread on commercial and industrial loans over the Fed funds rate, a hot 
issue market dummy, the offer price revision, the positive offer price revision, the number of uses for 
proceeds listed in the prospectus, and the fraction of the total offer underwritten by the deal underwriter.  
Dummy variables are utilized to identify VC backed deals, equity carve outs, LBOs, Nasdaq listed firms, 
first tier audited deals, deals for firms with antitakeover provisions in place, deals for firms in states with 
strong antitakeover laws (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Ohio), and deals without anticipated dividends.  
Lagged market return represents the compounded daily return on the CRSP value weighted index over the 
22 days preceding the IPO.  All regressions include year  and Fama and French industry dummy variables 
(not reported). 
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Table 10 Panel A – M&A Deals normalized by Industry Firms 
 
Three Months Six Months Twelve Months
Intercept -7.1632 -7.6971 -9.2045
(0.6920) (0.6704) (0.6123)
M&A activity (total M&A deals) 0.2723 0.1673 0.0791
(0.0227) (0.0190) (0.0696)
LN offer value -1.1782 -1.2112 -1.2157
(0.0554) (0.0488) (0.0481)
Capital market liquidity 0.0631 0.0649 0.0745
(0.5573) (0.5461) (0.4890)
Hot issue dummy 1.7427 1.7710 1.8208
(0.0730) (0.0683) (0.0610)
Offer-price revision 0.2255 0.2279 0.2239
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Positive offer-price revision 0.9043 0.9018 0.9068
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
LN number of uses 0.5253 0.5365 0.5469
(0.6382) (0.6311) (0.6246)
Underwriter market share 0.7781 0.7791 0.7817
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Venture-backed 1.6940 1.6998 1.6826
(0.0459) (0.0452) (0.0475)
Equity-carve-out -2.4457 -2.4051 -2.4040
(0.0994) (0.1052) (0.1055)
Reverse-LBO -3.4326 -3.3208 -3.3301
(0.0761) (0.0863) (0.0856)
Nasdaq-listed 1.2755 1.2811 1.2424
(0.3054) (0.3033) (0.3182)
First-tier audited -2.5485 -2.4601 -2.4200
(0.1169) (0.1300) (0.1365)
Anti-takeover provisions 0.0122 0.0350 0.0383
(0.9934) (0.9810) (0.9792)
Anti-takeover state -0.3256 -0.4095 -0.4016
(0.8350) (0.7933) (0.7974)
No anticipated dividends 1.2829 1.2401 1.2660
(0.3038) (0.3198) (0.3100)
Lagged-market return 0.3291 0.3272 0.3234
(0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0138)
Adjusted R-square 0.2933 0.2934 0.2927
Observations 2363 2363 2363
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Table 10 Panel B – M&A Value normalized by Industry Market Capitalization 
 
Three Months Six Months Twelve Months
Intercept -8.8422 -8.0447 -6.2567
(0.6254) (0.6571) (0.7298)
M&A activity (total M&A deals) 0.4232 0.1817 0.0116
(0.0203) (0.1129) (0.8835)
LN offer value -1.2012 -1.1919 -1.2064
(0.0507) (0.0527) (0.0500)
Capital market liquidity 0.0766 0.0715 0.0654
(0.4762) (0.5064) (0.5431)
Hot issue dummy 1.7699 1.8011 1.8371
(0.0685) (0.0639) (0.0589)
Offer-price revision 0.2174 0.2205 0.2193
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Positive offer-price revision 0.9137 0.9110 0.9131
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
LN number of uses 0.5980 0.5970 0.5654
(0.5925) (0.5934) (0.6132)
Underwriter market share 0.7860 0.7849 0.7863
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Venture-backed 1.6297 1.6828 1.6720
(0.0548) (0.0475) (0.0490)
Equity-carve-out -2.4259 -2.4443 -2.4532
(0.1022) (0.0998) (0.0988)
Reverse-LBO -3.3992 -3.4342 -3.4439
(0.0706) (0.0761) (0.0755)
Nasdaq-listed 1.2041 1.1938 1.1885
(0.3330) (0.3375) (0.3399)
First-tier audited -2.4736 -2.3899 -2.4232
(0.1279) (0.1416) (0.1363)
Anti-takeover provisions -0.1115 -0.0174 0.0121
(0.9395) (0.9906) (0.9934)
Anti-takeover state -0.3285 -0.3586 -0.3291
(0.8335) (0.8186) (0.8335)
No anticipated dividends 1.3916 1.3805 1.2817
(0.2646) (0.2691) (0.3047)
Lagged-market return 0.3221 0.3250 0.3175
(0.0141) (0.0134) (0.0157)
Adjusted R-square 0.2933 0.2924 0.2917
Observations 2363 2363 2363
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Table 10 Panel C – M&A Value normalized by Industry Asset Base 
 
Three Months Six Months Twelve Months
Intercept -7.0929 -6.5605 -6.1378
(0.6947) (0.7168) (0.7345)
M&A activity (total M&A deals) 0.5037 0.2312 0.0020
(0.0096) (0.0758) (0.9823)
LN offer value -1.2146 -1.2072 -1.2076
(0.0482) (0.0497) (0.0498)
Capital market liquidity 0.0729 0.0685 0.0655
(0.4975) (0.5242) (0.5427)
Hot issue dummy 1.7759 1.8027 1.8396
(0.0675) (0.0636) (0.0586)
Offer-price revision 0.2158 0.2197 0.2191
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Positive offer-price revision 0.9162 0.9119 0.9135
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
LN number of uses 0.5924 0.5926 0.5642
(0.5958) (0.5960) (0.6140)
Underwriter market share 0.7851 0.7847 0.7865
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Venture-backed 1.6314 1.6871 1.6720
(0.0545) (0.0469) (0.0491)
Equity-carve-out -2.4174 -2.4647 -2.4542
(0.1033) (0.0970) (0.0986)
Reverse-LBO -3.4894 -3.4377 -3.4485
(0.0713) (0.0758) (0.0751)
Nasdaq-listed 1.2307 1.2271 1.1895
(0.3224) (0.3242) (0.3395)
First-tier audited -2.4800 -2.4145 -2.4259
(0.1268) (0.1374) (0.1359)
Anti-takeover provisions -0.1364 -0.0433 0.0155
(0.9259) (0.9765) (0.9916)
Anti-takeover state -0.3608 -0.3554 -0.3216
(0.8174) (0.8202) (0.8372)
No anticipated dividends 1.3803 1.3835 1.2761
(0.2682) (0.2678) (0.3069)
Lagged-market return 0.3218 0.3279 0.3174
(0.0142) (0.0126) (0.0157)
Adjusted R-square 0.2937 0.2926 0.2917
Observations 2363 2363 2363
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Table 11 - Survival Probability as a Function of Pre-IPO M&A Activity 
 
The sample is all U.S. IPO events with an offer price greater than or equal to $5 occurring during the period January 1990 through September 1998.  The sample 
of control transactions is all public or private target firms, total deal value of over $1 million and a completed, pending, or withdrawn status.  The first 5 columns 
of results utilize the deal based proxy for the prior 3 months while columns 6 through 10 measure pre-IPO corporate control activity using the value based proxy 
normalized by industry assets over the 6 months preceding the IPO.  Additional variables include a dummy variable for deals backed by venture capitalists, the 
offer value (in millions), a sales-to-price multiplier calculated as the most recent fiscal-year-end net sales divided by the first-day market capitalization, a control 
for the investment bank reputation, a dummy variable for Nasdaq-listed firms, and dummies for firms with antitakeover devices in place and firms incorporated 
in a state with strong antitakeover laws (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Ohio).  All regressions include Fama and French dummy variables (not reported). 
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Logistic:  M&A
Deals Prior 3 Months Assets Prior 6 months
One Year Two Years Three Years Four Years Five Years One Year Two Years Three Years Four Years Five Years
Intercept -24.0766 -3.0925 -1.1638 -1.0318 -0.8779 -22.4568 -2.3105 -0.7733 -0.6826 -0.3622
(0.9305) (0.0021) (0.0952) (0.0943) (0.1230) (0.9372) (0.0150) (0.2472) (0.2473) (0.5042)
M&A Activity 0.1473 0.0894 0.0499 0.0448 0.0671 0.1244 0.0652 0.0529 0.0452 0.0575
(0.0600) (0.0042) (0.0133) (0.0154) (0.0002) (0.0174) (0.0073) (0.0045) (0.0101) (0.0022)
Venture-backed -0.0312 0.0021 0.0580 0.0073 -0.0272 0.0134 -0.0081 0.0542 0.0036 -0.0392
(0.9568) (0.9922) (0.7050) (0.9566) (0.8265) (0.9816) (0.9695) (0.7235) (0.9786) (0.7515)
LN offer value 0.0761 0.0293 -0.0924 -0.0379 0.0174 -0.0441 -0.0312 -0.1160 -0.0596 -0.0143
(0.8673) (0.8329) (0.3702) (0.6685) (0.8321) (0.9216) (0.8183) (0.2542) (0.4955) (0.8600)
Sales to price multiplier -0.0842 0.0007 -0.0343 -0.0672 -0.0546 -0.1777 -0.0120 -0.0415 -0.0729 -0.0608
(0.8045) (0.9931) (0.5850) (0.2422) (0.2624) (0.6295) (0.8840) (0.5216) (0.2160) (0.2228)
Underwriter market share -12.0717 -0.2707 2.1208 1.6297 0.1708 -10.1025 0.1241 2.2944 1.8136 0.3987
(0.2398) (0.9042) (0.1899) (0.2473) (0.8974) (0.2891) (0.9558) (0.1542) (0.1955) (0.7622)
Nasdaq-listed -0.8993 -0.3344 -0.3130 -0.1037 0.0635 -0.9879 -0.3721 -0.3245 -0.1124 0.0475
(0.2727) (0.2548) (0.1537) (0.5863) (0.7233) (0.2162) (0.2055) (0.1392) (0.5549) (0.7910)
Anti-takeover state 0.0841 -1.1188 -0.1376 -0.2260 -0.3023 0.1096 -1.1057 -0.1440 -0.2359 -0.3278
(0.9365) (0.0628) (0.6418) (0.3742) (0.2003) (0.9175) (0.0647) (0.6257) (0.3528) (0.1642)
Anti-takeover provisions 9.0365 0.5620 0.1392 0.0558 0.0515 8.8876 0.6176 0.1493 0.0661 0.0791
(0.9317) (0.2406) (0.6117) (0.7990) (0.7964) (0.9275) (0.1946) (0.5860) (0.7627) (0.6914)
Correct predictions 88.7% 68.4% 67.0% 64.9% 64.4% 87.2% 68.0% 66.8% 64.8% 63.9%
Number of observations 2162 2106 2001 1866 1788 2162 2106 2001 1866 1788
Aggregate number of mergers 15 133 290 440 584 15 133 290 440 584
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Table 12 - Post-IPO Institutional Ownership as a Function of IPO Underpricing 
 
The sample is all U.S. IPO events with an offer price greater than or equal to $5 occurring during the period 
January 1990 through September 1998.  The sample of control transactions is all public or private target 
firms, total deal value of over $1 million and a completed, pending, or withdrawn status.  Post-IPO 13f 
institutional ownership is measured at the end of the quarter following the IPO and at subsequent 1, 2, 3, 4 
and 5 year intervals.  Additional variables include a dummy variable for deals backed by venture 
capitalists, the offer value (in millions), and the fraction of the total offer underwritten by the deal.  All 
regressions include Fama-French Industry dummies  (not reported). 
 
Table 12 Panel A – Average Institutional Ownership 
 
One Quarter One Year Two Years Three Years Four Years Five Years
Intercept 2.4270 2.9129 2.7337 2.4053 2.1044 2.3004
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Initial return -0.0075 -0.0057 -0.0048 -0.0047 -0.0052 -0.0050
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0019)
LN offer value -0.3257 -0.3484 -0.3293 -0.3066 -0.2719 -0.3130
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Underwriter market share 0.0019 -0.0073 -0.0109 -0.0114 -0.0180 -0.0181
(0.7590) (0.1988) (0.1014) (0.0850) (0.0206) (0.0291)
Venture-backed 0.1021 0.1105 0.1302 0.1127 0.0031 -0.0287
(0.0594) (0.0284) (0.0279) (0.0547) (0.9647) (0.7015)
Adjusted R-square 0.0905 0.1236 0.1034 0.1020 0.0718 0.0940
Number of observations 2055 2029 1895 1689 1483 1261
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Table 12 Panel B – Maximum Institutional Ownership 
 
 
One Quarter One Year Two Years Three Years Four Years Five Years
Intercept 2.5951 3.6253 3.3360 4.6446 3.5321 4.3872
(3.0000) (0.0028) (0.0065) (0.0010) (0.0482) (0.0227)
Initial return -0.0145 -0.0119 -0.0057 -0.0077 -0.0108 -0.0088
(0.0270) (0.0982) (0.4381) (0.3314) (0.2723) (0.3734)
LN offer value 0.6564 0.8863 0.9736 0.7681 1.1471 0.8524
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0028)
Underwriter market share -0.0095 0.0212 -0.0015 0.0095 -0.0600 -0.0097
(0.7729) (0.5542) (0.9668) (0.8133) (0.2243) (0.8489)
Venture-backed 0.7674 1.2635 1.6450 1.9747 1.5022 1.5690
(0.0084) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Adjusted R-square 0.0197 0.0310 0.0298 0.0346 0.0233 0.0170
Number of observations 2055 2029 1895 1689 1483 1261
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Table 13 - Relation between Survival and Post-IPO Institutional Blockholdings 
 
The sample is all U.S. IPO events with an offer price greater than or equal to $5 occurring during the period 
January 1990 through September 1998.  The sample of control transactions is all public or private target 
firms, total deal value of over $1 million and a completed, pending, or withdrawn status.  The columns 
measure the probability of a firm remaining independent one through five years following the IPO with the 
institutional blockholding as the primary independent variable of interest.  Additional control variables 
include a sales-to-price multiplier calculated as the most recent fiscal-year-end net sales divided by the 
first-day market capitalization, a dummy variable for Nasdaq-listed firms, and dummies for firms with 
antitakeover devices in place and firms incorporated in a state with strong antitakeover laws 
(Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Ohio).  All regressions include year and Fama and French industry 
dummy variables (not reported).  Panel A reports the results for average institutional blockholdings while 
Panel B reports the results for the largest institutional blockholding. 
 
Table 13 Panel A – Average Institutional Blockholding 
 
Logistic:  Survivability
Two Years Three Years Four Years Five Years
Intercept -15.1880 -3.5891 -2.3162 -0.9807
(0.9443) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0816)
Average institutional block 0.2515 0.2223 0.1760 0.1708
(0.0047) (0.0018) (0.0058) (0.0049)
Sales to price multiplier 0.0993 0.0405 0.0039 0.0193
(0.2907) (0.5733) (0.9509) (0.7157)
Nasdaq-listed -0.6079 -0.4050 -0.0933 0.0413
(0.0289) (0.0491) (0.5996) (0.8033)
Anti-takeover state -0.9228 0.0929 -0.1745 -0.2591
(0.1315) (0.7663) (0.5248) (0.3054)
Anti-takeover provisions 0.2818 -0.2206 -0.2802 -0.2519
(0.6066) (0.4686) (0.2446) (0.2461)
Correct predictions 76.6% 74.7% 71.8% 70.1%
Number of observations 1846 1764 1669 1621
Aggregate number of mergers 111 257 404 549
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Table 13 Panel B – Largest Institutional Blockholding 
 
Logistic:  Survivability
Two Years Three Years Four Years Five Years
Intercept -15.2747 -3.5982 -2.2984 -0.9829
(0.9420) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0814)
Largest insitutional block 0.0344 0.0208 0.0144 0.0160
(0.0243) (0.0974) (0.1851) (0.0988)
Sales to price multiplier 0.1039 0.0555 0.0170 0.0291
(0.2535) (0.4174) (0.7808) (0.5757)
Nasdaq-listed -0.5220 -0.3127 -0.0278 0.1078
(0.0568) (0.1223) (0.8740) (0.5114)
Anti-takeover state -0.9545 0.0881 -0.1837 -0.2642
(0.1194) (0.7779) (0.5034) (0.2962)
Anti-takeover provisions 0.2346 -0.2460 -0.2951 -0.2694
(0.6665) (0.4174) (0.2194) (0.2132)
Correct predictions 75.8% 74.0% 71.4% 69.8%
Number of observations 1846 1764 1669 1621
Aggregate number of mergers 111 257 404 549
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Figure 1 - Average Underpricing by Country of Listing 
The sample is all IPO events occurring during the period 2000-2004. The sample of countries is formed by the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) studies.  Simple average underpricing for each country is presented. 
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Figure 2 - Initial Public Offerings by Issue Year 
 
The sample is all IPO events occurring during the period 2000-2004. The sample of countries is formed by 
the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) studies.  Figure 2 presents the total number of IPOs by Issue Year. 
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Figure 3 - Initial Public Offering Underpricing by Issue Year 
 
The sample is all IPO events occurring during the period 2000-2004. The sample of countries is formed by 
the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) studies.  Figure 3 presents the average IPO underpricing by Issue Year. 
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Figure 4 - Initial Public Offerings by Industry 
 
The sample is all IPO events occurring during the period 2000-2004. The sample of countries is formed by 
the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) studies.  Figure 4 presents the total number of IPOs by Industry where industry definitions mimic 
those utilized in Table 1 of Dyck and Zingales (2004) with the addition of a hi-tech classification driven by 
the study of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). 
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Figure 5 - Initial Public Offering Underpricing by Industry 
 
The sample is all IPO events occurring during the period 2000-2004. The sample of countries is formed by 
the intersections of the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) studies.  Figure 5 presents average underpricing by Industry where industry definitions mimic those 
utilized in Table 1 of Dyck and Zingales (2004) with the addition of a hi-tech classification driven by the 
study of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). 
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Figure 6 - Domestic IPO Underpricing and Recent Control Activity 
 
The sample is all U.S. IPO events with an offer price greater than or equal to $5 occurring during the period January 1990 through September 1998.  The sample 
of control transactions is all public or private target firms, total deal value of over $1 million and a completed, pending, or withdrawn status.    Vertical bars 
illustrate average underpricing in the month of consideration and correspond to the left vertical axis.  The square line represents the number of deals in the prior 
three months and corresponds to the right vertical axis.  Trendline measures average IPO underpricing 
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